Small Claims Decisions

Date Issued:  January 25, 2018

File: SC-2017-002343

Type: Small Claims

Civil Resolution Tribunal

Indexed as: Robertson v. Radium Valley Vacation Resort, 2018 BCCRT 18

Between:

Jay Robertson

Applicant

And:

Radium Valley Vacation Resort

Respondent

INTRODUCTION

1.         A company called Canada Mortgage Management Corporation (CMMC) is the owner and management company for the respondent Radium Valley Vacation Resort (RVVR), a recreational vehicle or RV resort. The applicant initially named CMMC as the respondent when he filed the application for dispute resolution, but then filed for an amended Dispute Notice to name RVVR as the respondent. I find RVVR is the proper respondent in the circumstances, although nothing turns on whether it is RVVR or CMMC.

2.         The applicant says the respondent improperly refused to permit a third party, Ms. M, to transfer her RV timeshare lot lease to the applicant. The respondent says it had a pre-existing valid agreement with Ms. M that it could obtain her lease. Ultimately, Ms. M did not transfer the lease to either of the parties.

3.         The applicant wants damages of $3,500 and “time lost” due to the respondent’s alleged negligence. The applicant is self-represented and the respondent is represented by Mr. Holmgren, who owns CMMC.

JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE

4.         These are the formal written reasons of the Civil Resolution Tribunal (tribunal). The tribunal has jurisdiction over small claims brought under section 3.1 of the Civil Resolution Tribunal Act (Act). The tribunal’s mandate is to provide dispute resolution services accessibly, quickly, economically, informally, and flexibly. In resolving disputes, the tribunal must apply principles of law and fairness, and recognize any relationships between parties to a dispute that will likely continue after the dispute resolution process has ended.

5.         The tribunal has discretion to decide the format of the hearing, including by writing, telephone, videoconferencing, email, or a combination of these. I decided to hear this dispute through written submissions, because I find that there are no significant issues of credibility or other reasons that might require an oral hearing. Neither party requested an oral hearing.

6.         The tribunal may accept as evidence information that it considers relevant, necessary and appropriate, whether or not the information would be admissible in a court of law. The tribunal may also ask questions of the parties and witnesses and inform itself in any other way it considers appropriate.

7.         Under tribunal rule 121, in resolving this dispute the tribunal may: order a party to do or stop doing something, order a party to pay money, or order any other terms or conditions the tribunal considers appropriate. 

8.         The Dispute Response and the tribunal decision plan that contained the parties’ submissions had named a different entity other than CMMC or RVVR. On January 21, 2018, I asked the case manager to clarify the proper respondent’s name, as referenced above. As noted above, RVVR is the correct respondent. The applicant sent new evidence in response, unrelated to the name issue. I instructed the case manager to advise the parties I would not accept new evidence at this point, in accordance with the tribunal’s rules and that the evidence deadline of October 27, 2017 has long passed.

ISSUEs

9.         The issues in this dispute are:

a.     Whether the respondent improperly interfered with the applicant’s agreement with a third party to buy a lease,

b.     If so, what remedy is appropriate.

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

10.      In a civil claim such as this, the applicant bears the burden of proof, on a balance of probabilities. I have only addressed the evidence and arguments to the extent necessary to explain my decision.

11.      On March 14, 2017, the applicant emailed the respondent to say he had noted there were timeshare lots for sale on its website. The next day, the respondent advised the price was $5,400, but that “old price” would be “off the table” the following week. The parties then engaged in some negotiation, but ultimately the applicant said the respondent’s $4,500 price was too high for him.

12.      Upon the applicant’s and Ms. M’s request, Mr. Holmgren later agreed to permit the lease transfer from Ms. M to the applicant, for $3,500, given his position he had a pre-existing deal with Ms. M for the same lot. On April 3, 2017, the applicant refused.

13.      Mr. Holmgren says he understood he had a deal to buy Ms. M’s timeshare lot for $1,000. It appears based on that not-yet-final agreement he had listed her lot for sale, at a higher price. Apparently, the applicant responded to that listing, but then came to an agreement with Ms. M directly for an amount less than Mr. Holmgren’s listing but higher than the $1,000 Mr. Holmgren was going to pay Ms. M. The respondent refused to permit Ms. M to transfer her lease, based on its deal with her and the consent requirements in her lease agreement.

14.      There is a consent provision on the back of a Certificate of Lease, which indicates the respondent must consent to a lease assignment. An example of the respondent’s standard form lease agreement for a 96-year lease also contains a term that the lessee agrees not to assign the lease unless the assignee enters into an agreement in favour of the lessor.

15.      The essence of the applicant’s argument is that Mr. Holmgren’s agreement with Ms. M. was invalid because of irregularities in the documentation of that agreement. The applicant also argues that the respondent has failed to act in the best interests of all strata lot owners, as required under the Strata Property Act (SPA). As such, the applicant says that Mr. Holmgren’s and Ms. M’s incomplete agreement could not form a reasonable basis upon which to prevent Ms. M from transferring her lease to the applicant.

16.      Generally speaking, the SPA governs strata corporations and owners with respect to their relationship and not with respect to outside parties. The applicant is not an owner within the strata corporation that runs the respondent RV resort, and thus I find I need not consider the applicant’s argument under the SPA for the purposes of this dispute. For similar reasons, I need not address the applicant’s allegation that Mr. Holmgren is in a conflict of interest by representing the respondent.

17.      It is undisputed that the applicant and the respondent never had any contract or agreement between them. I say the same about CMMC.

18.      Therefore, ultimately the applicant’s argument is reduced to whether the respondent engaged in what is known in law as “the tort of contractual interference” or “the tort of interference with contractual relations”. In other words, did the respondent improperly interfere with the applicant’s and Ms. S’s agreement. In order to succeed, the applicant needs to prove:  1) the existence of a validly enforceable contract, 2) the respondent’s awareness of the contract’s existence, 3) wrongful interference, and 4) damages suffered by the applicant. (See Hayes Heli-Log Services Ltd. v. Siller Bros. Inc., 1999 BCCA 451 and I.A.T.S.E. v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters et al., 2004 BCSC 432).

19.      Here, the alleged interference is that the respondent refused Ms. M the consent she required under her lease agreement. The respondent’s request for $3,500 was to put it in the position it would have been in had its agreement with Ms. M completed.

20.      So, was there a validly enforceable contract between the applicant and Ms. M? Was the respondent’s interference “wrongful”? I find the applicant has not established either of these elements of the contractual interference tort. First, the applicant and Ms. M’s agreement was not enforceable, because the respondent’s consent was a pre-requisite for that contract to be enforceable. Second, given the respondent’s position that it had its own agreement with Ms. M, I find the applicant has not established that the respondent’s interference was wrongful. My further reasons are set out below.

21.      In addition to the conflict and SPA arguments I addressed above, the applicant also asserts that section 59 of the Law and Equity Act requires that all land transfer agreements must be in writing, and that Mr. Holmgren had no written contract with Ms. M and therefore they had no legal sale agreement. First, there are emails between the respondent and Ms. M, which I find is an arguable case for the respondent that he had a valid justification to rely upon his agreement with Ms. M.

22.      The applicant cites that section 59(4) of the Law and Equity Act requires acceptance of the payment, and as no payment was issued it could not be accepted. This latter submission is incorrect, because section 59(4) simply states that a party’s act that is not inconsistent with the contract includes payment. Section 59(4) does not require payment.

23.      As stated in I.A.T.S.E, citing Pacific Western Airlines Ltd. v. B.C. Federation of Labour (1986), 1986 CanLII 883 (BCCA):

… the legitimate exercise of a contractual right obtained prior to the right allegedly interfered with cannot give support to a claim in tort for interference with contractual relations.  The commercial world is founded on the premise that individuals are entitled to exercise their contractual rights for their own benefit, even though the incidental result might be to prevent another person from making or performing some other contract.

24.      In summary, I find that the applicant has failed to establish that the respondent did not have a valid agreement with Ms. M. I therefore find that the respondent was not unjustified in refusing to permit Ms. M’s lease assignment to the applicant. Put another way, the respondent’s desire to rely upon and enforce its own agreement with Ms. M was not unreasonable or unjustified.

25.      Given my conclusions above, I dismiss the applicant’s dispute. I note that the applicant’s alternative requested remedy was that I order the transfer of the lease from Ms. M to the applicant, without the $3,500 fee requested by the respondent. Ms. M is not a party to this dispute. In any event, while the tribunal can consider a claim for damages, as primarily requested here, the tribunal has no jurisdiction over land ownership disputes. Had I not dismissed the applicant’s dispute on the merits, I would have declined jurisdiction over this requested alternative remedy.

26.      As the applicant was unsuccessful in his primary claim, in accordance with the tribunal’s rules I also dismiss the applicant’s claim for reimbursement of $175 in tribunal fees.

ORDERS

27.      I order that the applicant’s dispute is dismissed.

28.      Under section 48 of the Act, the tribunal will not provide the parties with the Order giving final effect to this decision until the time for making a notice of objection under section 56.1(2) has expired and no notice of objection has been made.  The time for filing a notice of objection is 28 days after the party receives notice of the tribunal’s final decision.

29.      Under section 58.1 of the Act, a validated copy of the tribunal’s order can be enforced through the Provincial Court of British Columbia.  A tribunal order can only be enforced if no objection has been made and the time for filing a notice of objection has passed. Once filed, a tribunal order has the same force and effect as an order of the Provincial Court of British Columbia.