Date Issued: December 17, 2018

File: SC-2018-003326

Type: Small Claims

Civil Resolution Tribunal

Indexed as: Travis v. Keilty, 2018 BCCRT 858

Between:

Sherry Travis

Applicant

And:

Julie Keilty

Respondent

INTRODUCTION

1.      The respondent, Julie Keilty, was driving the applicant Sherry Travis’s car while they were running errands. The respondent backed the car into a pole, causing damage to the car. The applicant claims $1,273.86 in damage to the vehicle.

2.      The respondent says that the applicant should be responsible for the damage because she asked the respondent to drive. The respondent also says that the parties already resolved the claim and that the applicant has inflated the size of her claim.

3.      The parties are each self-represented.

JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE

4.      These are the formal written reasons of the Civil Resolution Tribunal (tribunal). The tribunal has jurisdiction over small claims brought under section 3.1 of the Civil Resolution Tribunal Act (Act). The tribunal’s mandate is to provide dispute resolution services accessibly, quickly, economically, informally, and flexibly. In resolving disputes, the tribunal must apply principles of law and fairness, and recognize any relationships between parties to a dispute that will likely continue after the dispute resolution process has ended.

5.      The tribunal has discretion to decide the format of the hearing, including by writing, telephone, videoconferencing, email, or a combination of these. In some respects, this dispute amounts to a “he said, she said” scenario with both sides calling into question the credibility of the other. Credibility of witnesses, particularly where there is conflict, cannot be determined solely by the test of whose personal demeanour in a courtroom or tribunal proceeding appears to be the most truthful. In the circumstances of this dispute, I find that I am properly able to assess and weigh the evidence and submissions before me. Further, bearing in mind the tribunal’s mandate that includes proportionality and a speedy resolution of disputes, I find that an oral hearing is not necessary. I also note the decision Yas v. Pope, 2018 BCSC 282 at paragraphs 32 to 38, in which the court recognized that oral hearings are not necessarily required where credibility is in issue. I therefore decided to hear this dispute through written submissions.

6.      The tribunal may accept as evidence information that it considers relevant, necessary and appropriate, whether or not the information would be admissible in a court of law. The tribunal may also ask questions of the parties and witnesses and inform itself in any other way it considers appropriate.

7.      Under tribunal rule 126, in resolving this dispute the tribunal may make one or more of the following orders:

a.    order a party to do or stop doing something;

b.    order a party to pay money;

c.    order any other terms or conditions the tribunal considers appropriate.

ISSUES

8.      The issues in this dispute are:

a.    Is the applicant responsible for the damage to her own car because she asked the respondent to drive?

b.    Did the respondent already pay the applicant back for the damage by helping her move and providing other services?

c.    Did the applicant inflate the value of her claim?

d.    Does it matter whether the applicant will actually spend the money to pay ICBC back for the repair costs?

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

9.      In a civil claim such as this, the applicant must prove her case on a balance of probabilities. While I have read all of the parties’ evidence and submissions, I only refer to what is necessary to explain and give context to my decision. In particular, I have not taken into account either parties’ submissions accusing the other of dishonesty in matters unrelated to this dispute.

10.   On October 14, 2017, the applicant asked the respondent to help her with errands. Even though they used the applicant’s vehicle, the applicant asked the respondent to drive. The respondent backed into a pole, causing damage. The respondent does not dispute that the accident was her fault.

11.   The applicant took her car to be repaired and paid a $300 deductible. The rest of the repair costs were covered by the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (ICBC).

12.   The parties were friends at the time of the accident, but are no longer speaking. The respondent says that after the accident, she worked off the cost of the accident by providing the applicant with a variety of services. The most significant services that the respondent performed were helping the applicant move in February 2018 and regularly cooking for the applicant’s pet. The respondent provided statements from 2 friends who support her claim that she helped the applicant with her move.

13.   On April 6, 2018, ICBC wrote to the applicant advising her that ICBC paid $973.86 towards the cost of the repairs from the accident. The applicant says that in a telephone call, an adjuster told her that her premiums would go up for 3 years and would end up being double the cost of the repairs. ICBC gave the applicant the option of paying back the repair costs and having the accident removed from her claims history.

14.   The respondent submits that because the applicant asked her to drive, the applicant should be responsible for any accidents. This submission is incorrect. If a driver is at fault for an accident, the driver is responsible to pay for the damage even if the owner of the vehicle asked them to drive.

15.   The respondent submits that she worked off the debt by helping the applicant for free. The applicant responds that the services that the respondent describes were all things that friends do to help out friends, particularly when they move, without an expectation of being paid. The applicant says that there was never any agreement that the respondent was working off a debt.

16.   The burden is on the respondent to prove that there was an agreement that the respondent would work off the cost of the accident. I find that the respondent has failed to prove that an agreement existed. In order for there to be an agreement that the respondent would work off the debt, there needs to be certainty about the amount of the debt and the amount of work required to work it off. I find that the applicant did not know the amount of the debt until April 6, 2018, when she received the letter from ICBC. This is well after the applicant moved and after the parties’ friendship had ended.

17.   The respondent’s position is essentially that the friendship was one-sided and that the respondent provided the applicant with valuable services while the applicant did nothing in return. The respondent therefore believes that the applicant is being vindictive and ungrateful by bringing this dispute. However, in the absence of an agreement, the respondent cannot claim that she should be reimbursed for the time she spent helping the applicant.

18.   The respondent submits that the applicant has inflated her claim by seeking the cost of repairs and the return of her deductible. The respondent believes it should be one or the other. I find that the respondent has misunderstood ICBC’s letter. I find that the total cost of the repairs was $1,273.86. The applicant paid a deductible of $300 and ICBC covered the rest.

19.   I find that to be fully compensated for the damage to her vehicle, the applicant is entitled to be reimbursed for the total cost of the repairs. In other words, the respondent must pay the deductible and the amount that the applicant would need to repay ICBC to remove the accident from the applicant’s claim history. In cases of negligence, the negligent person has to pay the amount of money it would take to put the applicant in the same position they would be in if the negligence had never happened. In this dispute, if the respondent had not caused the accident, the applicant would not have paid the deductible and her claims history would be unaffected.

20.   Finally, the respondent does not believe that the applicant will actually pay ICBC back. That may be so. However, the possibility that the applicant will not use the money she is awarded wisely does not affect how much she is entitled to. The applicant has established the amount of money that will fully compensate her for the accident. She is free to do whatever she wants with the money awarded. See Townsend v. Kroppmanns, 2004 SCC 10, at paragraph 21.

21.   The respondent also believes that it is too late for the applicant to pay ICBC back. There is insufficient evidence before me to determine whether or not that is the case. However, I am satisfied that if the applicant chooses not to repay ICBC or is no longer able to repay ICBC, her premiums will go up in an amount more than the cost of the repairs. In either case, the applicant will not be in a better position than if the accident had not happened. Therefore, I am satisfied that there is no issue of double recovery in awarding the full cost of the repairs.

22.   I find that the applicant is entitled to $1,273.86, as claimed.

23.   Under section 49 of the Act, and tribunal rules, the tribunal will generally order an unsuccessful party to reimburse a successful party for tribunal fees and reasonable dispute-related expenses. However, the applicant has not made a claim for reimbursement of tribunal fees or dispute-related expenses.

ORDERS

24.  Within 30 days of the date of this order, I order the respondent to pay the applicant a total of $1,291.88, broken down as follows:

a.    $1,273.86 as reimbursement for the costs of the accident, and

b.    $18.02 in pre-judgment interest under the Court Order Interest Act.

25.  The applicant is entitled to post-judgment interest, as applicable.

26.  Under section 48 of the Act, the tribunal will not provide the parties with the Order giving final effect to this decision until the time for making a notice of objection under section 56.1(2) has expired and no notice of objection has been made. The time for filing a notice of objection is 28 days after the party receives notice of the tribunal’s final decision.

27.  Under section 58.1 of the Act, a validated copy of the tribunal’s order can be enforced through the Provincial Court of British Columbia. A tribunal order can only be enforced if it is an approved consent resolution order, or, if no objection has been made and the time for filing a notice of objection has passed. Once filed, a tribunal order has the same force and effect as an order of the Provincial Court of British Columbia.