Small Claims Decisions

Decision Information

Decision Content

Date Issued: January 6, 2020

File: SC-2019-006210

Type: Small Claims

Civil Resolution Tribunal

Indexed as: Heritage Inn Hotel and Convention Center v. Dycar Pharmaceuticals Ltd., 2020 BCCRT 19

Between:

HERITAGE INN HOTEL AND CONVENTION CENTER

 

Applicant

And:

DYCAR PHARMACEUTICALS LTD.

 

Respondent

REASONS FOR DECISION

Tribunal Member:

Julie K. Gibson

INTRODUCTION

1.      This dispute is about unpaid hotel bills on a corporate account.

2.      The applicant Heritage Inn Hotel and Convention Center says the respondent Dycar Pharmaceuticals Ltd. rented hotel rooms from it and failed to pay the invoices. The applicant claims $2,570.51, for hotel stays and food and beverages it says were incurred by the respondent’s employees.

3.      The respondent says the charges were incurred by individuals personally and are not its responsibility to pay. The respondent asks that the dispute be dismissed.

4.      The applicant is represented by business contact Darrel Sims. The respondent is represented by business contact Scott Badcock.

JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE

5.      These are the formal written reasons of the Civil Resolution Tribunal (tribunal). The tribunal has jurisdiction over small claims brought under section 118 of the Civil Resolution Tribunal Act (CRTA). The tribunal’s mandate is to provide dispute resolution services accessibly, quickly, economically, informally, and flexibly. In resolving disputes, the tribunal must apply principles of law and fairness, and recognize any relationships between parties to a dispute that will likely continue after the dispute resolution process has ended.

6.      The tribunal has discretion to decide the format of the hearing, including by writing, telephone, videoconferencing, email, or a combination of these. I decided to hear this dispute through written submissions, because I find that there are no significant issues of credibility or other reasons that might require an oral hearing.

7.      The tribunal may accept as evidence information that it considers relevant, necessary and appropriate, whether or not the information would be admissible in a court of law. The tribunal may also ask questions of the parties and witnesses and inform itself in any other way it considers appropriate.

8.      Where permitted by section 118 of the CRTA, in resolving this dispute the tribunal may order a party to do or stop doing something, pay money or make an order that includes any terms or conditions the tribunal considers appropriate.

ISSUE

9.      The issue in this dispute is whether the respondent agreed to pay the charges for the hotel, food and beverage costs, such that it must pay the applicant the claimed $2,570.51.

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

10.   In this civil claim, the applicant bears the burden of proof on a balance of probabilities. I have reviewed the evidence and submissions but only refer to them as I find necessary to provide context for my decision.

11.   On November 30, 2017, the respondent applied for a credit account with the applicant. The applicant approved a $5,000 credit account for the respondent on December 8, 2017.

12.   The terms of the credit agreement were that accounts would be paid within 30 days, subject to 2% monthly interest on overdue accounts. The agreement did not specify an annual rate as required by the federal Interest Act.

13.   On April 25, 2018, CW entered a lease agreement for a suite at the applicant’s hotel.

14.   At the time, I find that CW was the respondent’s vice president of Sales & Marketing and accounts payable supervisor, as specified on the lease agreement. A long term rental was being arranged as CW, in her capacity as the respondent’s employee, was relocating.

15.   The parties agree that the respondent paid a $1,250 damage deposit to the applicant for CW’s lease, and the applicant has not returned it.

16.   The applicant says the respondent failed to pay the following invoices:

a.    May 21, 2018-June 2, 2018 hotel room stay, $1,263.24,

b.    October 10, 2018 food and beverage charges, $66.61,

c.    December 2, 2018 hotel room stay $115.35, and

d.    December 17-24, 2018, hotel room and food and beverage charges, $1,125.31.

17.   The applicant says that the respondent’s representative CW, made all the hotel reservations for the disputed stays. They say CW had the authority to bind the respondent in contracts for those hotel stays at the time. I agree.

18.   A company may be held liable for the conduct of its agent, if the agent had actual or apparent authority.

19.   In Keddie v. Canada Life Assurance Co., 1999 BCCA 541, the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that actual authority stems from the legal relationship between principal and agent, created by a consensual agreement. Here, I find that CW had actual authority to bind the respondent for bookings to the credit account. I base this finding on the credit application which identifies CW as an authorized representative of the respondent for the purpose of the credit account.

20.   As well, I find that CW had apparent authority to bind the respondent. That is, the respondent’s conduct towards the applicant about CW at the time was such that she was clothed with apparent authority.

21.   I will now consider the invoices in turn.

May 21, 2018-June 2, 2018 Invoice - $1,263.24

22.   The respondent says the May 21, 2018-June 2, 2018 invoice was incurred by KR who did not work directly for the respondent. The respondent says KR was not on the list of approved users of its credit account with the applicant. It is not necessary for KR to be specifically authorized, because I have found the booking was made by CW, who had actual and apparent authority to bind the respondent.

23.   The respondent also submits that the applicant “should have known that” KR did not work directly for it. He was a construction superintendent on a project where the respondent says that another company invoiced it for his accommodations and then that company paid KR a per diem rate. The respondent also did not provide documentation to prove that it had an arrangement whereby KR would use his per diem to pay accommodation costs, nor to prove that the other company had already invoiced it for KR’s accommodation costs. The respondent also did not file an email or other document where it told the respondent that KR needed to pay for this booking personally.

24.   I find that the respondent must pay the $1,263.24 invoice. I say this because the booking was made by CW on behalf of the respondent, and on August 14, 2018 SN of the respondent’s accounting department wrote to send her the invoice and she would “take care of it!”.

October 10, 2018 Invoice - $66.61

25.   The October 10, 2018 food and beverage bill was charged to CW as the respondent’s representative. In submissions, the respondent agrees, and I find, that it is responsible to pay this $66.61 bill.

December 2, 2018 Invoice - $115.35

26.   The December 2, 2018 hotel stay was for PT but authorized by CW as the respondent’s representative. Again, I find that CW was authorized by the respondent to book and pay for this stay, at the time. Therefore, I find the respondent must pay the applicant the $115.35 claimed for this stay.

27.   An October 11, 2019 email from CW to the applicant’s general manager, DS, says that PT and RF’s stays were both approved by the respondent. CW wrote that PT was interviewing for a CFO position with the respondent, while RF was doing a construction audit on the respondent’s building.

28.   Therefore, I find the respondent must pay the applicant the $115.35 claimed for this stay.

December 17-24, 2018 Invoice - $1,125.31

29.   In late fall 2018, a dispute arose between the respondent’s directors and shareholders.

30.   The December 17-24, 2018, hotel room and food and beverage charges, $1,125.31 were booked for RF by CW as the respondent’s representative. RF was one of the respondent’s shareholders. The respondent says the booking was made by its shareholder and not an employee. I disagree, since CW’s email was used to make the booking, and RF was in Cranbrook to complete a construction audit for the respondent. Though he may have also been a shareholder, I find the respondent is responsible to pay the applicant for this stay. If the respondent believes it has a claim against RF to recover those funds, it is free to pursue one subject to any applicable limitation period.

31.   I have considered that, on December 18, 2018, the British Columbia Supreme Court issued an order that any directors, officers, employees and agents of the respondent were not to enter into or vary any material agreement, commitment or incurrence of any material liability other than in the ordinary course of business and on notice to all directors until after a January 10, 2019 shareholders’ meeting.

32.   I find that this restriction does not excuse the respondent from paying the applicant the claimed invoices. I say this because the December 17-24, 2018 hotel booking was made, and the commitment to pay for the stay was entered on behalf of the respondent, prior to the December 18 court order.

33.   For these reasons, I find that the respondent must pay the $1,125.31 for the December 17-24, 2018 hotel stay and food and beverage charges.

34.   The applicant also says CW paid a $1,250 security deposit, and that it will apply that amount to the outstanding invoices. I infer that the applicant agrees that the room was left in satisfactory condition and therefore the respondent would be entitled to a refund of it, but for the outstanding invoices on its account. Because the security deposit was paid by the respondent for CW’s room lease in her capacity as its employee, but has yet to be refunded, I find the respondent has already paid $1,250 against the claimed invoices.

35.   I find that the respondent must pay the applicant the claimed $2,570.51 less the $1,250 already paid. I find that the respondent must therefore pay $1,320.57 to the applicant, within 30 days of this decision.

36.   The Court Order Interest Act applies to the tribunal. The applicant is entitled to pre-judgement interest on the $1,320.57 from December 24, 2018 the last date of the final contested invoice, to the date of this decision. This equals $26.59.

37.   Under section 49 of the CRTA and tribunal rules, the tribunal will generally order an unsuccessful party to reimburse a successful party for tribunal fees and reasonable dispute-related expenses. I see no reason in this case not to follow that general rule. I find the applicant is entitled to reimbursement of $125 in tribunal fees. The applicant claimed $750 as a dispute-related expenses for “collection fees”. I find this expense was not necessary for this tribunal proceeding, nor proven through receipts. I therefore dismiss the claim for collection fees.

ORDERS

38.   Within 30 days of the date of this order, I order the respondent to pay the applicant a total of $1,472.16, broken down as follows:

e.    $1,320.57 in payment for outstanding charges on its account,

f.     $26.59 in pre-judgment interest under the Court Order Interest Act, and

g.    $125 tribunal fees.

39.  The applicant is entitled to post-judgment interest, as applicable.

40.  Under section 48 of the CRTA, the tribunal will not provide the parties with the Order giving final effect to this decision until the time for making a notice of objection under section 56.1(2) has expired and no notice of objection has been made. The time for filing a notice of objection is 28 days after the party receives notice of the tribunal’s final decision.

41.  Under section 58.1 of the CRTA, a validated copy of the tribunal’s order can be enforced through the Provincial Court of British Columbia. A tribunal order can only be enforced if it is an approved consent resolution order, or, if no objection has been made and the time for filing a notice of objection has passed. Once filed, a tribunal order has the same force and effect as an order of the Provincial Court of British Columbia. 

 

Julie K. Gibson, Tribunal Member

 

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