Date Issued: June 10, 2021

File: SC-2020-009445

Type: Small Claims

 

Civil Resolution Tribunal

Indexed as: Vallance v. Webb, 2021 BCCRT 640

Between:

HEATHER LORRAINE VALLANCE

Applicant

And:

KYLE WEBB

Respondent

And:

HEATHER LORRAINE VALLANCE

Respondent BY COUNTERCLAIM

REASONS FOR DECISION
Tribunal Member:	David Jiang

INTRODUCTION

1.      This dispute is about a lean-to shelter. The applicant, Heather Lorraine Vallance, hired the respondent, Kyle Webb, to build the shelter. She says the shelter was deficient and in response to her complaints, Mr. Webb disassembled the shed and took back the materials used. She claims $1,000 for a deposit refund. She also claims $500 for “help” to resolve the action, $100 for gas expenses, and $330 for unspecified additional expenses.

2.      Mr. Webb disagrees and says that he properly built the shelter. He says that partway through the shelter’s construction, Ms. Vallance refused to pay to complete it. He says he was entitled to remove the shelter components. He counterclaims for $1,000 as money owing under a September 17, 2020 invoice.

3.      The parties represent themselves.

4.      For the reasons that follow, I find the parties entered into a second, new agreement to resolve their dispute. I find that under the agreement, Ms. Vallance is entitled to a refund of $1,000. I dismiss the parties’ remaining claims and counterclaims.

JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE

5.      These are the formal written reasons of the Civil Resolution Tribunal (CRT). The CRT has jurisdiction over small claims brought under section 118 of the Civil Resolution Tribunal Act (CRTA). Section 2 of the CRTA states that the CRT’s mandate is to provide dispute resolution services accessibly, quickly, economically, informally, and flexibly. In resolving disputes, the CRT must apply principles of law and fairness, and recognize any relationships between the dispute’s parties that will likely continue after the CRT process has ended.

6.      Section 39 of the CRTA says the CRT has discretion to decide the format of the hearing, including by writing, telephone, videoconferencing, email, or a combination of these. Here, I find that I am properly able to assess and weigh the documentary evidence and submissions before me. Further, bearing in mind the CRT’s mandate that includes proportionality and a speedy resolution of disputes, I find that an oral hearing is not necessary in the interests of justice.

7.      Section 42 of the CRTA says the CRT may accept as evidence information that it considers relevant, necessary and appropriate, whether or not the information would be admissible in a court of law. The CRT may also ask questions of the parties and witnesses and inform itself in any other way it considers appropriate.

8.      Where permitted by section 118 of the CRTA, in resolving this dispute the CRT may order a party to do or stop doing something, pay money or make an order that includes any terms or conditions the CRT considers appropriate.

ISSUES

9.      The issues in this dispute are as follows:

a.    Did the parties enter into a new agreement, and if so, is Ms. Vallance entitled to a refund of the $1,000 deposit?

b.    Did Ms. Vallance breach the parties’ contract, and if so, is Mr. Webb entitled to payment of $1,000 for work done?

c.    Is Ms. Vallance entitled to compensation for “help”, gas expenses, or other unspecified additional expenses?

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

10.   In a civil proceeding like this one, Ms. Vallance and Mr. Webb must prove their respective claims and counterclaims on a balance of probabilities. I have read all the parties’ submissions but refer only to the evidence and argument that I find relevant to provide context for my decision.

11.   I begin with the undisputed background facts. On September 5, 2020, Mr. Webb went to Ms. Vallance’s property. The parties entered into a verbal agreement for Mr. Webb to build the shed. The agreement had the following terms. Mr. Webb would build the shed in 2 stages. Each stage would cost $2,000, for a total of $4,000. In stage 1 Mr. Webb would build a secure frame and roof. In stage 2 Mr. Webb would build walls and put up siding. Submissions indicate that Mr. Webb would purchase new materials but also use some materials provided by Ms. Vallance.

12.   The parties also agreed that Ms. Vallance would pay Mr. Webb $1,000 as a deposit to begin stage 1. Ms. Vallance paid the deposit on September 8, 2020.

13.   Mr. Webb purchased rocks for the base of the shed and bought other materials. He began work as contemplated. On September 16, 2020, Mr. Webb finished stage 1. Ms. Vallance messaged Mr. Webb using Facebook that day. She said she was displeased with the work and felt the shed was unstable. Mr. Webb disagreed with her assessment, but wrote that he would return the deposit and take down the shed. He explained that he could use the shed at his house. Ms. Vallance did not object to this but said she wanted Mr. Webb to leave materials she had provided. Those materials included a deck board and 2 sheets of plywood. Ms. Vallance does not claim for these materials in this dispute and did not provide any evidence about their value.

14.   On the morning of September 17, 2020, Ms. Vallance messaged Mr. Webb. She said she wanted Mr. Webb to keep the deposit and she would keep the shed. Mr. Webb disagreed in his reply. Later that day, he went to Ms. Vallance’s property with workers or family members and dismantled the shed, taking the materials.

15.   Ms. Vallance says she did not intervene at the time because Mr. Webb said that he would return the deposit after dismantling the shed. I find Ms. Vallance’s version of events is likely true as it consistent with the Facebook messages from September 16, 2020. It also plausibly explains Ms. Vallance’s inaction. Finally, Mr. Webb did not deny Ms. Vallance’s account in submissions.

16.   Mr. Webb then sent Ms. Vallance a September 17, 2020 invoice. He charged $1,510 for labour and materials for shed construction and $500 for removing the shed. He accounted for Ms. Vallance’s deposit, which left a balance owing of $1,010.

Issue #1. Did the parties enter into a new agreement, and if so, is Ms. Vallance entitled to a refund of the $1,000 deposit?

17.   As noted above, Ms. Vallance wrote in the September 2020 messages that she felt the shed was deficient. I find nothing turns on this because, regardless of the shed’s quality or workmanship, the parties reached a new agreement on September 16, 2020 to settle the matter.

18.   For a contract to exist, there must be an offer, acceptance of the offer, and consideration, which is something of value given by each party. The Facebook messages show Mr. Webb offered to take down the shed and refund Ms. Vallance’s deposit to resolve the matter. I find that Ms. Vallance accepted the offered terms given the messages in evidence and the fact that she allowed Mr. Webb to remove the shed and keep its parts. I also find that the parties each would have received something of value under the agreement. Mr. Webb would keep the shed materials, minimize his losses, and resolve the dispute. Ms. Vallance would have her deposit returned.

19.   I find the new agreement could also be characterized as an amendment to their existing agreement. In any event, the parties’ resulting obligations are the same.

20.   There is no indication that under the new agreement’s terms, Mr. Webb could charge Ms. Vallance any fees. I find this would be inconsistent with Mr. Webb’s offer to return Ms. Vallance’s deposit. I return to this point below.

21.   Mr. Webb dismantled the shed and kept the materials but did not return the $1,000 deposit. He did not explain these actions in light of the September 16, 2020 Facebook messages in which he says he would return the deposit. I find he breached the parties’ agreement, so I order Mr. Webb to pay Ms. Vallance $1,000 as damages for breach of contract.

22.   I considered deciding whether Ms. Vallance might be entitled to a refund under the provisions of the Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act. However, given my conclusion, I do not find it necessary to do so.

Issue #2. Did Ms. Vallance breach the parties’ contract, and if so, is Mr. Webb entitled to payment of $1,000 for work done?

23.   Mr. Webb claims $1,000 for money owing under the September 17, 2020 invoice. Mr. Webb says that when Ms. Vallance advised him on September 17, 2020 that he should keep the deposit and leave the shed, he “realized that no further payment would be coming”.

24.   I find that Mr. Webb essentially alleges that Ms. Vallance’s text was an anticipatory breach of the parties’ contract. Such a breach would allow Mr. Webb to treat the contract as terminated and claim damages.

25.   I do not find any anticipatory breach proven in the circumstances. By September 16, 2020 the parties had already agreed that Mr. Webb would dismantle the shed and refund Ms. Vallance’s deposit. As noted above, it was Mr. Webb that first suggested this. Ms. Vallance suggested the next day for the parties to each “walk away” in her message. I find this was merely a new proposal that Mr. Webb rejected. It did not entitle him to any additional remedies or to breach the parties’ new agreement. The parties still performed the new contract terms, as Ms. Vallance allowed Mr. Webb to remove the shed without protest.

26.   In the invoice, Mr. Webb charged $1,610 for the stage 1 work and $500 for removing the shed. I have already found that there is no indication in the Facebook messages or otherwise that Ms. Vallance agreed to pay for such work under the parties’ new agreement. I dismiss all of Mr. Webb’s counterclaims for this reason.

Issue #3. Is Ms. Vallance entitled to compensation for “help”, gas expenses, or other unspecified additional expenses?

27.   As stated earlier, Ms. Vallance claims $500 for “help” to resolve the action, $100 for gas expenses, and $330 for other expenses. It is unclear if these were incurred before or after Ms. Vallance applied for dispute resolution, so I have treated these as substantive claims rather than as dispute-related expenses.

28.   In either event, the result is the same. I dismiss all these claims because they are unsupported by any evidence, such as receipts or invoices. Ms. Vallance also did not explain how the gas and other unspecified expenses were related to this dispute.

29.   I would also decline to order reimbursement for the “help” because of CRT rules 9.5(3) and 9.5(5). Rule 9.5(3) says that the CRT will not order compensation for legal fees unless there are extraordinary circumstances. Similarly, rule 9.5(5) says that, except in extraordinary circumstances, the CRT will not order one party to pay another party compensation for time spent dealing with the CRT proceeding. I did not find anything in this dispute to be extraordinary.

INTEREST, FEES AND EXPENSES

30.   The Court Order Interest Act applies to the CRT. Ms. Vallance is entitled to pre-judgment interest on the $1,000 damages award for breach of contract, from September 17, 2020, the date Mr. Webb dismantled the shed, to the date of this decision. This equals $3.28.

31.   Under section 49 of the CRTA and CRT rules, the CRT will generally order an unsuccessful party to reimburse a successful party for CRT fees and reasonable dispute-related expenses. I see no reason in this case not to follow that general rule. Ms. Vallance has been largely successful, so she is entitled to reimbursement of $150 in CRT fees.

ORDERS

32.   Within 14 days of the date of this order, I order Mr. Webb to pay Ms. Vallance a total of $1,153.28, broken down as follows:

a.    $1,000 as damages for breach of contract,

b.    $3.28 in pre-judgment interest under the Court Order Interest Act, and

c.    $150 in CRT fees.

33.   Ms. Vallance is entitled to post-judgment interest, as applicable.

34.   I dismiss Ms. Vallance’s remaining claims and all of Mr. Webb’s counterclaims.

35.   Under section 48 of the CRTA, the CRT will not provide the parties with the Order giving final effect to this decision until the time for making a notice of objection under section 56.1(2) has expired and no notice of objection has been made. The time for filing a notice of objection is 28 days after the party receives notice of the CRT’s final decision. The Province of British Columbia has enacted a provision under the COVID-19 Related Measures Act which says that statutory decision makers, like the CRT, may waive, extend or suspend mandatory time periods. This provision is expected to be in effect until 90 days after the state of emergency declared on March 18, 2020 ends, but the Province may shorten or extend the 90-day timeline at any time. A party should contact the CRT as soon as possible if they want to ask the CRT to consider waiving, suspending or extending the mandatory time to file a Notice of Objection to a small claims dispute.

36.   Under section 58.1 of the CRTA, a validated copy of the CRT’s order can be enforced through the Provincial Court of British Columbia. A CRT order can only be enforced if it is an approved consent resolution order, or, if no objection has been made and the time for filing a notice of objection has passed. Once filed, a CRT order has the same force and effect as an order of the Provincial Court of British Columbia.