Date Issued: December 7, 2021

File: SC-2021-005130

Type: Small Claims

Civil Resolution Tribunal

Indexed as: Shergill Law Corporation v. Grewal, 2021 BCCRT 1286

Between:

SHERGILL LAW CORPORATION

Applicant

And:

DARSHAN GREWAL

Respondent

INTRODUCTION

1.      This dispute is about payment for legal services. The applicant law firm, Shergill Law Corporation (Shergill), claims $2,832.96 as payment for the legal services it provided to the respondent Darshan Grewal.

2.      Mr. Grewal says he owes nothing further to Shergill because he says he had terminated the retainer agreement before the work at issue was done.

3.      Shergill is represented by its owner, lawyer Mandy Shergill. Mr. Grewal is self-represented.

JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE

4.      These are the formal written reasons of the Civil Resolution Tribunal (CRT). The CRT has jurisdiction over small claims brought under section 118 of the Civil Resolution Tribunal Act (CRTA). The CRT’s mandate is to provide dispute resolution services accessibly, quickly, economically, informally, and flexibly. In resolving disputes, the CRT must apply principles of law and fairness, and recognize any relationships between parties to a dispute that will likely continue after the dispute resolution process has ended.

5.      CRTA section 39 says the CRT has discretion to decide the format of the hearing, including by writing, telephone, videoconferencing, email, or a combination of these. Bearing in mind the CRT’s mandate that includes proportionality and a speedy resolution of disputes, I find I can fairly hear this dispute based on the submitted evidence and through written submissions.

6.      Under CRTA section 42, the CRT may accept as evidence information that it considers relevant, necessary, and appropriate, whether or not the information would be admissible in a court of law. The CRT may also ask questions of the parties and witnesses and inform itself in any other way it considers appropriate.

7.      Where permitted CRTA section 118, in resolving this dispute the CRT may: order a party to do or stop doing something, order a party to pay money, or order any other terms or conditions the CRT considers appropriate.

ISSUES

8.      The issues are:

a.    Did Mr. Grewal terminate the parties’ retainer agreement before the invoiced work at issue was done?

b.    To what extent, if any, is Shergill entitled to $2,832.96 for legal services?

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

9.      In a civil claim like this one, as the applicant Shergill has the burden of proving its claims, on a balance of probabilities (meaning “more likely than not”). I have only referenced below what I find is necessary to give context to my decision.

10.   The parties’ December 6, 2019 retainer agreement includes the following relevant terms:

a.    Ms. Shergill would bill $275 per hour, with other rates for other lawyers, articled students, and legal assistants.

b.    Mr. Grewal has the right to terminate the agreement on written notice to Shergill. In that event, Mr. Grewal only has to pay for work “included up until the time we stopped acting for you”.

c.    Accounts are payable immediately and interest on overdue accounts is 1.8% per month. The agreement did not specify an equivalent annual rate.

d.    Mr. Grewal agrees to pay Shergill’s “legal costs and expenses for enforcing a payment or collection of our outstanding account”.

11.   Shergill’s January 18, 2021 statement of account bills $2,958.96, the amount Shergill originally claimed, for work done on over 30 dates between August 19, 2020 and December 15, 2020. In reply submissions, Shergill reduces its claim by $126 to account for an incorrect entry on the account, leaving a $2,832.96 balance.

12.   I find most of the work detailed on the statement of account post-dates Mr. Grewal’s September 2, 2020 email to Ms. Shergill that said he was unwilling to pay more legal fees and that he thought it would be best if he picked up his file. Mr. Grewal undisputedly did not pick up his file.

13.   Mr. Grewal relies on his September 2, 2020 email to argue he terminated the agreement and so he does not owe anything further. In contrast, Shergill says that Mr. Grewal phoned its office on numerous occasions giving instructions to assist in “wrapping up his file”. Shergill also relies on the further interactions between the parties after September 2, 2020, to show that Mr. Grewal had not terminated the retainer.

14.   I turn to the relevant chronology.

15.   Shergill’s detailed statement of account shows that after September 2, 2020 Ms. Shergill communicated with opposing counsel and Mr. Grewal on multiple occasions. The account shows Ms. Shergill also billed for her time having telephone calls with Mr. Grewal after September 2, 2020. Shergill’s September 11, 2020 email to Mr. Grewal confirmed that following a telephone conversation with Mr. Grewal it was enclosing the settlement breakdown Mr. Grewal had requested. There is no indication in the email that Mr. Grewal had terminated the retainer agreement.

16.   Mr. Grewal emailed Ms. Shergill again on October 23, 2020 to largely complain about his circumstances but he also touched on whether Shergill needed to respond to opposing counsel. I find this email inconsistent with Mr. Grewal’s position that he had earlier ended the retainer agreement. Further, Mr. Grewal contacted Shergill on other occasions about his legal matter in October, although I acknowledge most of Shergill’s billing relates to finalizing a court order and communicating with opposing counsel. In a November 2, 2020 email to Mr. Grewal, Ms. Shergill responded to explain some of the underlying issues in the legal matter, and said she was still Mr. Grewal’s lawyer and so was legally obliged to respond to correspondence in a timely matter. She invited Mr. Grewal to contact her office if he had concerns. There is no evidence he did so.

17.   On November 30, 2020, Shergill staff met with Mr. Grewal for him to sign the final Order. On December 7, 2020, Shergill emailed Mr. Grewal a copy of a Final Consent Order filed that date in court and advised that it sent a letter on his behalf to a third party and would update Mr. Grewal when a response was received. Mr. Grewal did not respond, until after Shergill sent the January 18, 2021 statement of account and he said he would not pay.

18.   Ms. Shergill filed a Notice of Withdrawal in court on January 19, 2021.

19.   On balance, I do not accept Mr. Grewal’s argument that he thought attending on November 30 to sign the Order was something that would only “take a minute” and that otherwise his instructions to Shergill after September 2, 2020 were to take no further action. I find the weight of the evidence, including Shergill’s billing and the parties’ emails and text messages, do not support this conclusion.

20.   Mr. Grewal also appears to argue Shergill wasted some time because a “divorce paper was filled out wrong from the beginning”. Yet, Shergill says it had to re-do the court filing because it was not aware that Mr. Grewal’s former counsel had not filed a marriage certificate to obtain the divorce. I have no evidence to the contrary. Mr. Grewal does not otherwise allege the work was sub-standard or identify any error in the billing (apart from the $126 I have addressed above). On balance, I find there is nothing obviously deficient in the work Shergill did that would allow me to conclude a deduction from Shergill’s bill was warranted. I find to prove such a deficiency Mr. Grewal would need expert evidence of the standard of care of a reasonable lawyer in the circumstances (see Bergen v. Guliker, 2015 BCCA 283). Here, there is no such expert evidence.

21.   So, I find Shergill is entitled to the $2,832.96.

22.   As noted, the parties’ contract provides for 1.8% monthly interest, but did not specify an annual rate. Section 4 of the federal Interest Act says that where an annual equivalent rate is not stated in the contract, a maximum of 5% annual interest applies. So, I allow 5% annual interest. Calculated from January 18, 2021 to the date of this decision, this interest equals $125.35.

23.   Under section 49 of the CRTA and the CRT’s rules, a successful party is generally entitled to reimbursement of their CRT fees and reasonable dispute-related expenses. Shergill was substantially successful and so I find it is entitled to reimbursement of the $125 it paid in CRT fees.

24.   Shergill claims $924 in dispute-related expenses, based on 3 hours of Ms. Shergill’s time at $275 per hour to deal with this CRT dispute, plus tax. Shergill relies on the retainer agreement clause, which as quoted above says Mr. Grewal agrees to pay Shergill’s “legal costs and expenses” in taking enforcement action. I do not allow the $924 for the following reasons. First, I find the retainer agreement clause is not sufficiently clear that Ms. Shergill’s $275 hourly rate applied. Second, there is no evidence that Ms. Shergill billed Shergill for her own time in dealing with this dispute so there is no evidence Shergill, as the named applicant law firm, actually incurred the claimed $924. Third, CRT rule 9.5 reflects CRTA section 20 (which says self-representation is the norm) and that legal fees and “time spent” are not usually compensable except in extraordinary cases. This is not an extraordinary case.

ORDERS

25.   Within 30 days of this decision, I order Mr. Grewal to pay Shergill a total of $3,083.31, broken down as follows:

a.    $2,832.96 in debt,

b.    $125.35 in pre-judgment interest at 5% annually, and

c.    $125 in CRT fees.

26.   Shergill is entitled to post-judgment interest under the Court Order Interest Act, as applicable.

27.   Under section 48 of the CRTA, the CRT will not provide the parties with the Order giving final effect to this decision until the time for making a notice of objection under section 56.1(2) has expired and no notice of objection has been made. The time for filing a notice of objection is 28 days after the party receives notice of the CRT’s final decision.

28.   Under section 58.1 of the CRTA, a validated copy of the CRT’s order can be enforced through the Provincial Court of British Columbia. A CRT order can only be enforced if it is an approved consent resolution order, or, if no objection has been made and the time for filing a notice of objection has passed. Once filed, a CRT order has the same force and effect as an order of the Provincial Court of BC.