Small Claims Decisions

Decision Information

Decision Content

Date Issued: January 31, 2023

File: SC-2022-004171

Type: Small Claims

Civil Resolution Tribunal

Indexed as: Ridgeline Mechanical Ltd. v. Devon Knapfl (dba Aces Roofing),
2023 BCCRT 87

Between:

RIDGELINE MECHANICAL LTD.

Applicant

And:

DEVON KNAPFL (Doing Business As ACES ROOFING)

Respondent

REASONS FOR DECISION

Tribunal Member:

Chad McCarthy

INTRODUCTION

1.      This dispute is about an alleged roofing contract. The applicant, Ridgeline Mechanical Ltd. (Ridgeline), undisputedly agreed to construct classrooms for a school district that is not a party to this dispute. At Ridgeline’s request, the respondent, Devon Knapfl (doing business as Aces Roofing), provided cost estimates for installing classroom roofing. Ridgeline says it “accepted” Mr. Knapfl’s quote, which it says committed him to installing 9 classroom roofs, but Mr. Knapfl then changed his mind and refused the work. Ridgeline claims $5,000 in damages for the increased cost, over Mr. Knapfl’s estimate, of engaging a different roofing contractor to do that work. I find Ridgeline has abandoned any claim to amounts exceeding $5,000, which is the Civil Resolution Tribunal’s (CRT) maximum small claims amount.

2.      Mr. Knapfl says his estimates were only price estimates, and by the time Ridgeline confirmed it wanted him to do particular roofing work, he had accepted other work and was no longer available. Mr. Knapfl says there was never any agreement to do the roofing work Ridgeline requested, so he owes nothing.

3.      An authorized employee represents Ridgeline in this dispute. Mr. Knapfl is self-represented.

JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE

4.      These are the CRT’s formal written reasons. The CRT has jurisdiction over small claims brought under section 118 of the Civil Resolution Tribunal Act (CRTA). Section 2 of the CRTA states that the CRT’s mandate is to provide dispute resolution services accessibly, quickly, economically, informally, and flexibly. In resolving disputes, the CRT must apply principles of law and fairness, and recognize any relationships between the dispute’s parties that will likely continue after the CRT process has ended.

5.      Section 39 of the CRTA says the CRT has discretion to decide the format of the hearing, including by writing, telephone, videoconferencing, email, or a combination of these. Here, I find that I am properly able to assess and weigh the documentary evidence and submissions before me. Further, bearing in mind the CRT’s mandate that includes proportionality and a speedy resolution of disputes, I find that an oral hearing is not necessary in the interests of justice.

6.      Section 42 of the CRTA says the CRT may accept as evidence information that it considers relevant, necessary, and appropriate, whether or not the information would be admissible in a court of law. The CRT may also ask questions of the parties and witnesses and inform itself in any other way it considers appropriate.

7.      Where permitted by section 118 of the CRTA, in resolving this dispute the CRT may order a party to do or stop doing something, pay money or make an order that includes any terms or conditions the CRT considers appropriate.

8.      Ridgeline submitted a negotiation document from the CRT’s facilitation stage of this dispute. The document said, in part, that communications made during negotiation are confidential and cannot be disclosed during the CRT’s decision process. This is consistent with CRT rule 1.11, which says that settlement communications must not be disclosed to a tribunal member unless the parties agree to the disclosure, or in other circumstances that do not apply here. I find the materials before me do not show that Mr. Knapfl agreed to disclose this document. So, I find the negotiation document is inadmissible, and I did not consider it in reaching my decision.

ISSUE

9.      The issue in this dispute is whether Mr. Knapfl agreed to provide the roofing services requested by Ridgeline, and if so, whether Mr. Knapfl owes $5,000 in damages.

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

10.   In a civil proceeding like this one, as the applicant Ridgeline must prove its claim on a balance of probabilities, meaning “more likely than not.” I have read the parties’ submissions and evidence but refer only to the evidence and arguments I find relevant to provide context for my decision. Mr. Knapfl submitted no documentary evidence and Ridgeline provided no submissions in reply to Mr. Knapfl’s, although each had an opportunity to do those things.

11.   At the outset, contrary to Ridgeline’s suggestion, I find there is no evidence that Mr. Knapfl was “part of a fixed price contract” between Ridgeline and the non-party school district for classroom construction. Ridgeline undisputedly communicated with Mr. Knapfl about potentially doing roofing work for Ridgeline. However, nothing before me shows that Mr. Knapfl provided cost estimates, discussed below, to Ridgeline knowing that Ridgeline would rely on them in fixed-price contract negotiations with others.

12.   The circumstances of the dispute are as follows. At Ridgeline’s request and under the name Aces Roofing, Mr. Knapfl provided a March 18, 2022 document titled “Estimate” for installing classroom roofing and related items. Although the estimate listed “9” in a column titled “QTY”, I find the estimate was clearly for the cost of a single roof, and not 9 roofs, which the parties do not dispute. The estimate listed the roofing services and types of materials included but did not separately itemize each cost. The total price after GST was $3,156.30. At the bottom, the estimate said, “Quote is valid for 30 days.” In context, I find this meant the pricing estimate for a single roof would be reasonably accurate for 30 days following the estimate’s date.

13.   Ridgeline did not respond to the initial estimate for more than 1 month, and then emailed Mr. Knapfl a classroom roofing purchase order document on April 26, 2022. However, there is no purchase order in evidence. Mr. Knapfl undisputedly responded that the price estimate was older than 30 days and was no longer valid, so he emailed Ridgeline a revised April 26, 2022 estimate. The updated estimate was identical to the previous estimate, but with a total price of $3,411.45.

14.   Ridgeline asked if Mr. Knapfl could lower the price by using different materials. Mr. Knapfl replied in an April 26, 2022 email that he would not use lower quality products, and so he declined the work. Ridgeline emailed again on May 4, 2022, and said it was “amenable” to Mr. Knapfl’s updated price. Ridgeline asked Mr. Knapfl if it could revise its purchase order to match the updated price and schedule the work. Mr. Knapfl replied the same day that he had been awarded several major projects in the past few days, and was now completely booked up for the foreseeable future, so he was unable to accommodate Ridgeline’s request. Mr. Knapfl did not install the roofs.

15.   A binding contract requires that there be an offer by one party, and acceptance of the offer by the other party. Ridgeline says, essentially, that the April 26, 2022 estimate was a binding “quote” that amounted to a contract offer by Mr. Knapfl to install 9 classroom roofs. Ridgeline says it accepted that alleged offer on May 4, 2022, forming an alleged contract that Mr. Knapfl then broke by not installing the roofs.

16.   First, I find that the April 26, 2022 estimate was a price estimate only, and was not a binding quote capable of being accepted by Ridgeline. Specifically, the estimate did not include essential terms such as a confirmation that Mr. Knapfl would be available to do the work when Ridgeline required it, among others. Further, I find the submitted evidence does not show that the parties discussed work dates or availability before May 4, 2022.

17.   Second, even if the April 26, 2022 estimate could be considered an offer by Mr. Knapfl, I find Ridgeline did not accept that offer. As noted, it instead asked Mr. Knapfl to lower his price by using different materials. In response, Mr. Knapfl said he had “to decline this work” because he would not use low quality products. Mr. Knapfl did not say whether he would still consider doing the job for the April 26, 2022 price estimate. I find none of the submitted evidence confirms that Mr. Knapfl remained open to doing the roofing job on any terms after April 26, 2022.

18.   Third, Ridgeline’s May 4, 2022 email asked Mr. Knapfl if he would proceed with the April 26, 2022 price and schedule the work. I find these questions showed Ridgeline knew the parties had not yet come to a binding agreement, and still needed to agree on a price, confirm Mr. Knapfl’s availability, and agree to a work schedule. As noted, Mr. Knapfl responded that he was no longer available, which I find was another explicit refusal of the proposed roofing work. I find this refusal confirmed that Mr. Knapfl no longer offered to do that work.

19.   For the above reasons, I find the parties never came to a binding agreement about the roofing work. So, there was no contract between them. I find Mr. Knapfl cannot be liable for breaching a non-existent contract.

20.   I note that Ridgeline has also not proven its claimed damages, for the following reasons. Ridgeline says it had “secured another contractor” to perform the roofing work at a higher cost than estimated by Mr. Knapfl. Ridgeline submitted a Summit Roofing Ltd. price estimate that showed a price of $4,042.50 per roof after tax. However, none of the evidence before me shows that Summit Roofing Ltd. or another contractor agreed to do the roofing work, or what price they ultimately agreed on, if any. I find the single Summit Roofing Ltd. price estimate is not sufficient evidence to prove that Ridgeline could not reasonably find another contractor to install the classroom roofs for the same price Mr. Knapfl estimated.

21.   I dismiss Ridgeline’s claim for $5,000.

CRT Fees and Expenses

22.   Under section 49 of the CRTA, and the CRT rules, the CRT will generally order an unsuccessful party to reimburse a successful party for CRT fees and reasonable dispute-related expenses. Here, I see no reason not to follow that general rule. Ridgeline was unsuccessful in its claim, but Mr. Knapfl paid no CRT fees. Neither party claimed CRT dispute-related expenses. So, I order no reimbursements.

ORDER

23.   I dismiss Ridgeline’s claim, and this dispute.

 

Chad McCarthy, Tribunal Member

 

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