Date Issued: January 15, 2025

File: SC-2023-008315

Type: Small Claims

Civil Resolution Tribunal

Indexed as: Carter v. Veteran Express Secure Logistics, 2025 BCCRT 50

Between:

JAKE CARTER

Applicant

And:

VETERAN EXPRESS SECURE LOGISTICS

Respondent

REASONS FOR DECISION
Tribunal Member:	Micah Carmody

INTRODUCTION

1.      Veteran Express Secure Logistics (VEXSL) employed Jake Carter as a driver, and later a manager, for a little over two years. VEXSL ended Mr. Carter’s employment without cause. Mr. Carter claims $5,000 in “severance pay”. Implicitly, he argues that he was contractually entitled to six weeks’ notice or the equivalent amount in wages. Mr. Carter represents himself.

2.      VEXSL says Mr. Carter was entitled to, at most, four weeks’ wages, and only if he signed a release. Because Mr. Carter has not signed a release, VEXSL says he has been overpaid and is not entitled to anything more. An authorized employee represents VEXSL.

JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE

3.      These are the formal written reasons of the Civil Resolution Tribunal (CRT). The CRT has authority over small claims brought under section 118 of the Civil Resolution Tribunal Act (CRTA). Section 2 of the CRTA says the CRT’s mandate is to provide dispute resolution services accessibly, quickly, economically, informally, and flexibly.

4.      The CRT has discretion to decide the hearing’s format, including in writing or by telephone or videoconference. Here, I find that I am properly able to assess and weigh the documentary evidence and submissions before me. The key facts are largely undisputed, and credibility is not central to this dispute. Bearing in mind the CRT’s mandate that includes proportionality and a speedy resolution of disputes, I decided to hear this dispute through written submissions.

5.      Section 42 of the CRTA says the CRT may accept as evidence information that it considers relevant, necessary and appropriate, whether or not the information would be admissible in court.

6.      Where permitted by section 118 of the CRTA, in resolving this dispute the CRT may order a party to pay money, return personal property, or do things required by an agreement about personal property or services. The order may include any terms or conditions the CRT considers appropriate.

ISSUES

7.      The issues in this dispute are:

a.    How many weeks’ notice was Mr. Carter entitled to under his employment contract?

b.    Does Mr. Carter’s refusal to sign a release mean VEXSL does not have to pay him anything more?

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

8.      As the applicant in this civil proceeding, Mr. Carter must prove his claims on a balance of probabilities, meaning more likely than not. While I have considered all the parties’ evidence and submissions, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision.

9.      Mr. Carter signed a written employment contract before starting employment with VEXSL on March 1, 2021. I return to the contract’s relevant terms below.

10.   At some point in 2023, Mr. Carter accepted a temporary layoff. According to VEXSL’s August 3, 2023 termination letter, VEXSL was unable to recall Mr. Carter to work and ended Mr. Carter’s employment without cause, effective June 12, 2023. So, Mr. Carter was employed for more than two but less than three years. None of this is disputed.

11.   The termination letter said VEXSL would pay Mr. Carter two weeks of salary, equaling $2,846.15, plus his accrued vacation pay, as required by the Employment Standards Act (ESA). In addition, the letter continued, in exchange for signing an attached release, VEXSL would pay Mr. Carter a further $3,038.46. VEXSL explains that this figure included $2,846.15 for two weeks’ wages plus $192.31 in lieu of benefits.

12.   Mr. Carter consulted a lawyer. As documented in the parties’ emails, they disagreed over whether the contract entitled Mr. Carter to four or six weeks’ notice. Mr. Carter also wanted VEXSL to remove a clause in the release requiring him to indemnify VEXSL for any claims or demands from certain government agencies.

13.   On August 14, 2023, VEXSL, without a signed release, sent Mr. Carter an email money transfer for $4,490.52, which he accepted. VEXSL provided a partial copy of a wage statement dated August 11 that I find likely corresponds to the August 14 money transfer. It provided for $6,809.61 in gross earnings, which included four weeks’ wages, the accrued vacation pay, and $192.31 for benefits. The copy does not show the full deductions or the net amount, but I infer that it was $4,490.52. So, I find VEXSL has paid Mr. Carter four weeks’ wages, plus $192.31 in lieu of benefits.

14.   Mr. Carter seeks to enforce the termination clause. It said this:

Severance: After your probation period has ceased, in the event that VEXSL wishes to terminate your employment, it shall be at liberty to do so, without proof of cause for dismissal, upon giving a period of notice as follows:

1) After the first three (3) months of your employment, but within the first year, two (2) weeks’ notice; and

2) After the first year, a base of two (2) plus an additional two (2) weeks’ notice per each completed year of service from the date of commencement of service to a maximum of twenty-six (26) weeks’ notice.

 

Alternatively, VEXSL shall be at liberty to terminate your employment without notice upon the payment of severance pay equal to the applicable amount of salary in lieu of the period of notice plus an amount equal to five (5) percent of the salary that would have been paid during the severance period as an allowance for the value of your collateral employment benefits […]

15.   The modern approach to contract interpretation involves reading the contract as a whole and giving the words their normal and ordinary meaning in line with the surrounding circumstances when the parties made the contract (see Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53).

16.   Mr. Carter argues that after completing his first year, he was entitled to six weeks’ notice, in the form of a base of two weeks’ notice, plus an additional two weeks’ notice for each of his two completed years of service from his start date.

17.   I interpret VEXSL’s position to be that “After the first year,” can be read to modify the counting of “each completed year of service”. This would restrict the counting of service years such that it did not include the first year. Mr. Carter would be entitled to four weeks’ notice.

18.   On a plain reading of the contract, I agree with Mr. Carter that he was entitled to six weeks’ notice. My view is that this is a more natural interpretation when reading the provision as a whole. Both clause 1 and clause 2 start with “After” a period of time that the employee must reach to be entitled to notice. Mr. Carter earned two weeks’ notice after three months. Then he earned a further two weeks’ notice for each year “from the date of commencement of service” – in other words, from his start date. I find there is no real ambiguity here.

19.   VEXSL argues that Mr. Carter’s interpretation does not align with industry standards or with severance it paid to previous employees with Mr. Carter’s job description or level of responsibility. However, VEXSL submitted no evidence about its previous severance payments or industry-standard severance payments or notice periods for drivers or managers. Regardless, I find the notice provision is unambiguous.

20.   If I am wrong and the notice provision is ambiguous, I agree with Mr. Carter that the principle of contra proferentum applies. This means that any doubt as to the meaning of the ambiguous provision is to be resolved against the party who drafted it. Applying that principle would favour Mr. Carter’s interpretation.

21.   Either way, I find Mr. Carter was entitled to six weeks’ notice. He did not get any notice, so VEXSL breached the contract. The equivalent of six weeks of Mr. Carter’s salary is $8,538.45. VEXSL paid Mr. Carter $5,692.30 for 4 weeks’ wages. So, I find he is owed $2,846.15. This is the gross amount before statutory deductions.

22.   In addition to regular wages, employees are generally entitled to bonuses and benefits they would have earned or received during the notice period, depending on the contract’s terms (see Egan v. Harbour Air Seaplanes LLP, 2024 BCCA 222, at paragraphs 74-77). Mr. Carter did not claim or provide evidence about entitlement to any bonuses. In emails with VEXSL, Mr. Carter claimed entitlement to 5% in lieu of benefits. I infer he seeks the same amount here within his claim for $5,000 in severance pay.

23.   The contract provided for 5% in lieu of benefits only where VEXSL paid severance. However, VEXSL does not dispute that Mr. Carter would have enjoyed group medical benefits during his notice period had he been given notice. The only question is the value of those benefits. In the absence of other evidence, such as the premiums Mr. Carter paid for private insurance, I rely on the parties’ decision to give them a value of 5% of Mr. Carter’s wages in the contract. I assess Mr. Carter’s damages for the loss of benefits during the notice period at 5% of $8,538.45, or $426.92. VEXSL has paid Mr. Carter $192.31 in lieu of benefits already, so I find it owes $234.61.

24.   In total, Mr. Carter is owed $3,080.76.

Does Mr. Carter’s refusal to sign a release mean VEXSL does not have to pay him?

25.   I excerpted part of the contract’s severance provision above. That provision went on to say that “VEXSL will require that you sign and return a Release before the payment to you of this severance pay.”

26.   VEXSL argues that because Mr. Carter has not signed and returned the release it provided with its termination letter, it does not have to pay him anything beyond what the ESA required. It says by paying him four weeks’ wages rather than the two weeks’ he would have been entitled to under the ESA, it overpaid him.

27.   I acknowledge that Mr. Carter framed his claim as one for “severance pay”, but as per my analysis above, his claim is for debt or damages from VEXSL’s breach of the employment contract by failing to give notice before ending his employment. Although the contractual provision Mr. Carter relies on was titled “Severance”, it clearly set out the notice period VEXSL was required to give Mr. Carter. This was independent of any obligation on Mr. Carter’s part to furnish a signed release in exchange for severance pay. So, I find the absence of a signed release is not a defence to Mr. Carter’s breach of contract claim.

28.   The Court Order Interest Act applies to the CRT. Mr. Carter is entitled to pre-judgment interest on the $3,080.76 from the June 12, 2023 termination date to the date of this decision. This equals $245.14.

29.   Under CRTA section 49 and the CRT rules, a successful party is generally entitled to reimbursement of their CRT fees and reasonable dispute-related expenses. Mr. Carter was generally successful, so I find he is entitled to reimbursement of $175 in paid CRT fees. Mr. Carter did not explicitly claim legal fees as a dispute-related expense or otherwise, but did submit a payment receipt from a law firm for $672. I find that this was for his consultation about VEXSL’s severance offer and not directly related to the conduct of this CRT proceeding. In any event, CRT rule 9.5(3) says the CRT will not order reimbursement of legal fees in small claims disputes unless there are extraordinary circumstances, which I find are not present here. So, to the extent that Mr. Carter claims reimbursement of legal fees, I dismiss that claim.

ORDERS

30.   Within 21 days of the date of this decision, I order VEXSL to pay Mr. Carter a total of $3,500.90, broken down as follows:

a.    $2,846.15 in debt,

b.    $234.61 in damages,

c.    $245.14 in pre-judgment interest under the Court Order Interest Act, and

d.    $175 in CRT fees.

31.   Mr. Carter is entitled to post-judgment interest, as applicable.

32.   I dismiss Mr. Carter’s remaining claims.

33.   This is a validated decision and order. Under section 58.1 of the CRTA, a validated copy of the CRT’s order can be enforced through the Provincial Court of British Columbia. Once filed, a CRT order has the same force and effect as a court order.