Date Issued: January 24, 2025

File: SC-2023-008407

Type: Small Claims

Civil Resolution Tribunal

Indexed as: Spencer v. United Health Associates Inc. (dba Broadway Station Medical Clinic), 2025 BCCRT 108

Between:

TIFFANY SPENCER

Applicant

And:

UNITED HEALTH ASSOCIATES INC. (Doing Business As BROADWAY STATION MEDICAL CLINIC)

Respondent

REASONS FOR DECISION
Tribunal Member:	Micah Carmody

INTRODUCTION

1.      This dispute is about inadvertent disclosure of medical records. Tiffany Spencer was a patient at United Health Associates Inc. (doing business as Broadway Stational Medical Clinic). Ms. Spencer injured her right foot and made a claim with WorkSafe BC. With Ms. Spencer’s authorization, WorkSafe requested from the clinic all available chart notes for treatment of Ms. Spencer’s feet from January 2022 to August 2023. The clinic sent WorkSafe all Ms. Spencer’s chart notes, which included the relevant page of notes, plus four pages that were undisputedly irrelevant and beyond WorkSafe’s request.

2.      Ms. Spencer, who is self-represented, claims $5,000 as a “penalty” for the clinic’s disclosure of her records. I find she really seeks compensation for intangible losses.

3.      The clinic says an office assistant made an honest mistake, it mitigated the damages by asking WorkSafe to destroy the records, it self-reported the incident to the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner, it reinforced its records disclosure policy with staff, and it apologized to Ms. Spencer. The clinic says I should therefore dismiss the claim. A principal represents the clinic.

AUTHORITY AND PROCEDURE

4.      These are the formal written reasons of the Civil Resolution Tribunal (CRT). The CRT has authority over small claims brought under section 118 of the Civil Resolution Tribunal Act (CRTA). Section 2 of the CRTA says the CRT’s mandate is to provide dispute resolution services accessibly, quickly, economically, informally, and flexibly.

5.      The CRT conducts most hearings by written submissions, but it has discretion to decide the hearing’s format, including in writing or by telephone or videoconference. Based on the evidence and submissions provided, I am satisfied that I can fairly decide this dispute without an oral hearing.

6.      Under section 10 of the CRTA, the CRT must refuse to resolve a claim that it considers to be outside the CRT’s authority or jurisdiction. A dispute that involves some issues that are outside the CRT’s jurisdiction may be amended to remove those issues.

7.      Section 42 of the CRTA says the CRT may accept as evidence information that it considers relevant, necessary and appropriate, whether or not the information would be admissible in court.

ISSUES

8.      The issue in this dispute is whether Ms. Spencer is entitled to any remedy for the clinic’s unauthorized disclosure of her medical records.

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

9.      As the applicant in this civil proceeding, Ms. Spencer must prove her claims on a balance of probabilities, meaning more likely than not. While I have considered all the parties’ evidence and submissions, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision.

10.   Most of the relevant facts are undisputed and it is not necessary to set them out in detail beyond the introduction above. Ms. Spencer says the records that should not have been disclosed were highly sensitive, such as charts relating to gynecological exams, which I accept, although the records before me have been redacted. The clinic does not dispute this except to say that the results of the extra chart notes and imaging reports included were “unremarkable.”

11.   In the Dispute Notice generated at the outset of this dispute, Ms. Spencer claimed $5,000 as “the maximum penalty through the CRT”. The CRT cannot penalize parties. The CRT’s small claims jurisdiction is set out in CRTA section 118(1) and is limited to claims about debt, damages, and personal property or services under $5,000.

12.   It is not uncommon for self-represented parties in CRT disputes to fail to clearly articulate the legal basis of their claims. The facts here suggest a breach of Ms. Spencer’s privacy, or negligent release of sensitive information.

13.   There is no common law breach of privacy tort (legal wrong) in BC (see Ari v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, 2015 BCCA 468 at paragraph 9). As the court noted in Moon v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees (Local 891), 2024 BCSC 1560, if the tort is eventually recognized, it likely includes an element of intent or at least recklessness in the disclosure (see paragraph 210), which I find is not present here.

14.   The Privacy Act makes it a tort, actionable without proof of damage, to invade another person’s privacy. I note section 2 of the Privacy Act sets out a number of exceptions that may apply on the facts of this dispute. However, I make no findings about whether the clinic breached the Privacy Act, because section 4 of that statute says a claim under it must be determined by the BC Supreme Court. So, to the extent the applicant claims a breach of the Privacy Act, I refuse to resolve that claim because it is beyond the CRT’s jurisdiction.

15.   The Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA) governs how private organizations, such as the clinic, collect, use, disclose, and protect personal information. The BC Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) oversees and enforces the PIPA. Consistent with previous CRT decisions such as Zheng v. Trans Union of Canada, Inc., 2023 BCCRT 469, I find the CRT does not have jurisdiction to determine if a breach of duty imposed under the PIPA has occurred. In any event, the IPC has already investigated the circumstances underlying this claim and closed its file without making an order after being satisfied with the clinic’s response to the breach and its effort to mitigate harm to Ms. Spencer.

16.   To succeed in negligence, Ms. Spencer must show that the clinic or one of its employees owed her a duty of care, that it breached the applicable standard of care, and that she experienced a loss or damage caused by the breach (see Mustapha v. Culligan of Canada Ltd., 2008 SCC 27).

17.   Ms. Spencer says this has been a tremendously humiliating experience. However, the law distinguishes between psychological disturbance that rises to the level of personal injury and psychological upset that does not amount to injury and therefore is not compensable (see Mustapha, at paragraph 9, and Lau v. Royal Bank of Canada, 2017 BCCA 253, at paragraphs 47-50). Agitation, anxiety, and other mental states that fall short of injury are generally not compensable. There is no objective evidence, such as medical reports. The evidence is that only one WorkSafe employee viewed the records, and they immediately redacted the sensitive information. So, I find the impact was relatively limited. The evidence overall falls short of showing the type of serious or prolonged harm that is compensable. For that reason, I dismiss Ms. Spencer’s negligence claim.

18.   As Ms. Spencer was unsuccessful, I dismiss her claim for CRT fees and for a corporate search. The clinic did not pay CRT fees or claim expenses.

ORDERS

19.   I refuse to resolve any claims for breach of the Privacy Act or PIPA.

20.   I dismiss Ms. Spencer’s remaining claims.