Date Issued: March 6, 2025

File: SC-2024-001693

Type: Small Claims

Civil Resolution Tribunal

Indexed as: Chartrand v. Chartrand, 2025 BCCRT 299

Between:

DEBBIE CHARTRAND

Applicant

And:

DANIELLE CHARTRAND

Respondent

REASONS FOR DECISION
Tribunal Member:	David Jiang

INTRODUCTION

1.      This dispute is about a dog. The applicant, Debbie Chartrand, says the respondent, Danielle Chartrand, breached a verbal agreement to share access to the dog. In some submissions the applicant referred to it as “my dog” and others the “family dog”. I will discuss the dog’s ownership below. The applicant seeks an order for the dog’s return. They also state a claim value of $3,500, though they emphasize they are seeking the dog rather than money.

2.      The respondent denies any agreement. She says she purchased the dog and never stopped caring for it.

3.      The parties represent themselves.

4.      For the reasons that follow, I dismiss the applicant’s claims.

JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE

5.      The Civil Resolution Tribunal (CRT) has jurisdiction over small claims brought under section 118 of the Civil Resolution Tribunal Act (CRTA). The CRT’s mandate is to provide dispute resolution services accessibly, quickly, economically, informally, and flexibly. In resolving disputes, the CRT must apply principles of law and fairness, and recognize any relationships between the dispute’s parties that will likely continue after the CRT process has ended. These are the CRT’s formal written reasons.

6.      Section 39 of the CRTA says the CRT has discretion to decide the hearing’s format, including by writing, telephone, videoconferencing, email, or a combination of these. The parties in this dispute each question the other’s credibility (truthfulness) about what occurred. In Downing v. Strata Plan VR2356, 2023 BCCA 100, the court recognized that oral hearings are not necessarily required where credibility is in issue. It depends on what questions turn on credibility, the importance of those questions, and the extent to which cross-examination may assist in answering those questions. Here, the parties provided their recollections and relevant documents, including pet care receipts. No party requested an oral hearing, and I find it unlikely that cross-examination would reveal any inconsistencies in any party’s evidence. So, I decided to hear this dispute through written submissions.

7.      Section 42 of the CRTA says the CRT may accept as evidence information that it considers relevant, necessary, and appropriate, whether or not the information would be admissible in court.

8.      Where permitted by section 118 of the CRTA, in resolving this dispute the CRT may order a party to do or stop doing something, pay money or make an order that includes any terms or conditions the CRT considers appropriate.

ISSUE

9.      The issue in this dispute is who owns the dog, and whether any remedies are appropriate.

BACKGROUND, EVIDENCE, AND ANALYSIS

10.   In a civil proceeding like this one, the applicant must prove their claims on a balance of probabilities. I have read all the parties’ submissions and evidence but refer only to the evidence and argument that I find relevant to provide context for my decision.

11.   I begin with the background facts, which are largely undisputed except where noted. In early 2012, the respondent purchased the dog from a third party for $375. This is documented in emails dated January 25, 2021 between the respondent and the third-party seller. It is undisputed that the applicant did not choose the dog or contribute any funds for purchasing the dog.

12.   The parties are family members. At the time of the dog purchase, the parties lived together in the same house.

13.   The parties give different accounts of what happened next. The applicant says in 2016, the respondent moved out and left the dog with the applicant. The applicant then moved out in July 2018. The dog lived with the applicant for the next 3 years. In 2021, the parties entered into a verbal agreement. Under its terms, the parties would take turns possessing the dog for 2 weeks at a time. In November 2023, the applicant dropped the dog off at the respondent’s residence. Roughly 2 weeks later, the applicant advised the respondent that they would be in Mexico from Christmas. This upset the respondent. So, she decided to keep the dog and breach the agreement.

14.   The respondent gives a different version of events. In June 2018 she moved out and took the dog with her. She moved again in September 2018, at which time she let the dog have “sleepovers” at the applicant’s residence. In May 2019 the respondent moved again and took the dog with her. She agreed to let the applicant have time with the dog on a temporary basis. The respondent denies she was upset about the applicant’s trip to Mexico. Instead, she stopped providing the dog because some of the applicant’s actions caused the respondent’s trauma to resurface.

15.   The applicant provided multiple letters that state the respondent left the dog with the applicant when she first moved out. These include CM’s October 28, 2024 letter, DS’s November 14, 2024 letter, CL’s November 1, 2024 letter, and DC’s October 31, 2024 letter. DC and CL are both the parties’ family members.

16.   In contrast, the respondent’s friend, TM, said in a November 14, 2024 letter that the respondent took the dog with her when the respondent moved in May 2019.

17.   Overall, I find the weight of the evidence supports the applicant’s version of events. I put particular weight on the evidence of DC and CL. I find that they would be most likely to know about the true circumstances of the parties. That said, I find it likely that the respondent moved out in 2018 and not 2016, as this best reconciles the parties’ evidence.

18.   I put no significance on whether the respondent stopped contacting the applicant because of the Mexico trip or some other reason. I find the reason is largely irrelevant to this dispute.

Who owns the dog, and are any remedies appropriate?

19.   The law about pet ownership is summarized in the non-binding decision of Peng v. Houston, 2024 BCCRT 505 at paragraphs 16 to 18. As stated there, courts have recognized the unique place pets occupy in people’s lives. That said, pets are legally considered personal property, and the principles of property law generally apply to pet ownership.

20.   In Alamaas v. Wheeler, 2020 BCPC 51, the court reviewed the law governing competing pet ownership claims. The court found factors to consider in determining ownership include the following: who bought and selected the pet, whether it was bought as a gift, who attended its veterinary appointments, who paid for the pet’s needs, who licensed it, and how the parties viewed ownership. Other factors courts have considered include who bore the burden of the pet’s care and comfort, agreements about ownership when the pet was acquired or after, and what happened to the pet after the parties’ relationship changed. See MacDonald v. Pearl, 2017 NSSM 5. This list is not exhaustive, and no single factor is necessarily sufficient to establish ownership. Courts have also increasingly considered animal welfare and the animal’s needs in considering ownership claims. See Atwal, and Munce v. Livingston, 2022 BCPC 108.

21.   Overall, I find the factors generally favour the respondent. As noted above, the evidence shows the respondent bought and selected the dog. Numerous receipts and invoices from December 11, 2012 to August 12, 2024 show that the respondent continued to pay for veterinary and other pet-related expenses. These expenses were considerable and exceeded the dog’s original purchase price. For example, the invoices, receipts, and submissions support payments of $2,611.20 for surgery in December 2012, $500 for teeth surgery in October 2020, and $29.36 for heartworm medication in June 2023. The respondent also paid to license the dog on December 17, 2024. There is no indication that the applicant ever paid for a dog license.

22.   Some factors assist the applicant, but to a lesser degree. As noted above, I accept that the respondent left the dog with the applicant for several years. However, as the respondent continued to pay veterinary and other expenses, I find this does not mean the respondent gave away or abandoned the dog. I find that during this time, the parties likely entered into a bailment situation, where the applicant agreed to safeguard the respondent’s dog. See Harris v. Maltman and KBM Autoworks, 2017 BCPC 273 and Pearson v. North River Towing (2004) Ltd., 2018 BCPC 229.

23.   Consistent with my conclusion, the applicant alleges the parties entered into a verbal agreement about sharing the dog. I find this claim suggests that the respondent still had an ownership interest in the dog. If the applicant owned the dog outright, I find the alleged agreement would be unnecessary.

24.   I also accept that the applicant paid for some pet care expenses. This included paying $500 to contribute to the October 2020 teeth surgery. However, the before me shows the respondent spent more than the applicant on pet care.

25.   In terms of animal welfare, the respondent says the applicant is an unsuitable caretaker. I find this contradicted by the respondent’s own actions. In particular, the respondent left the dog with the applicant for long periods of time. I am satisfied that both parties could provide suitable care for the dog. Ultimately, this factor does not substantially assist either party.

26.   CRTA section 118(1)(c) says the CRT may only order injunctive relief in very limited circumstances, such as for the return of personal property or specific performance of an agreement.

27.   I considered ordering specific performance of the applicant’s alleged agreement to share the dog. However, I did not for the following reasons.

28.   A contract is formed where there is an offer by one party, accepted by the other party, and supported by consideration. The test for determining whether the parties had an intention to create a contract is objective. It is based on what a reasonable person in the parties’ situation would have believed and understood, rather than what individual parties believed.

29.   The applicant did not describe a situation where one party made an offer, and another party accepted. There is no documentary evidence from 2021 that shows the parties intended to enter into a binding agreement about the dog. While verbal agreements are binding, they are more difficult to prove, and the applicant bears the burden of proof. I find it at least as likely as not that the respondent provided the dog to the applicant because the respondent found it convenient to do so, and because the applicant enjoyed the dog’s company. I find it unproven that the respondent did so under the terms of a binding agreement.

30.   Although not directly relevant, I note that under section 97(4.2) of the Family Law Act, the BC Supreme Court cannot order spouses to share joint ownership or possession of a companion animal. I find this reflects the reality that ordering shared pet access or ownership often leads to an impractical arrangement for the parties.

31.   In summary, I find the respondent owns the dog. As such, the respondent is free to keep the dog away from the applicant. I am also not satisfied that the parties entered into a binding agreement to share contact with the dog. I dismiss the applicant’s claims.

32.   Under section 49 of the CRTA and CRT rules, the CRT will generally order an unsuccessful party to reimburse a successful party for CRT fees and reasonable dispute-related expenses. I see no reason in this case not to follow that general rule. I dismiss the applicant’s claim for reimbursement of CRT fees. The parties did not claim any specific dispute-related expenses. So, I order none.

33.   This is a difficult situation, so I will conclude by stating I wish both parties well.

ORDER

34.   I dismiss the applicant’s claims.