Date Issued: July 17, 2025

File: SC-2024-001904

Type: Small Claims

Civil Resolution Tribunal

Indexed as: Koehler v. Higginbottom, 2025 BCCRT 996

Between:

STEVEN KOEHLER

Applicant

And:

JENN HIGGINBOTTOM

Respondent

INTRODUCTION

1.      Steven Kohler rented a room in Jenn Higginbottom’s house. Mr. Koehler says Ms. Higginbottom terminated the parties’ rental agreement without proper notice. He claims $400 for lost rent, $208 for lost income, and $800 for insufficient notice. This totals $1,408 in damages.

2.      Ms. Higginbottom denies Mr. Koehler is entitled to his claimed damages. Ms. Higginbottom says she ended the rental agreement because Mr. Koehler made her feel unsafe and uncomfortable in her home.

3.      The parties are each self-represented.

JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE

4.      The Civil Resolution Tribunal (CRT) has jurisdiction over small claims brought under section 118 of the Civil Resolution Tribunal Act (CRTA).

5.      Generally, the CRT does not have jurisdiction over residential tenancy disputes, which are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Residential Tenancy Branch under the Residential Tenancy Act (RTA). However, the RTA does not apply to roommate disputes or to living accommodations where a tenant shares a kitchen or a bathroom with the owner. The parties shared a kitchen and a bathroom, so I find the RTA does not apply, and the CRT has jurisdiction to decide this dispute.

6.      The CRT’s mandate is to provide dispute resolution services accessibly, quickly, economically, informally, and flexibly. In resolving disputes, the CRT must apply principles of law and fairness. These are the CRT’s formal written reasons.

7.      CRTA section 39 says the CRT has discretion to decide the hearing’s format, including by writing, telephone, videoconferencing, email, or a combination of these. Here, I find I am properly able to assess and weigh the documentary evidence and submissions before me. Further, bearing in mind the CRT’s mandate that includes proportionality and a speedy resolution of disputes, I find an oral hearing is not necessary in the interests of justice.

8.      CRTA section 42 says the CRT may accept as evidence information it considers relevant, necessary, and appropriate, whether or not the information would be admissible in court.

9.      Where permitted by CRTA section 118, in resolving this dispute the CRT may order a party to do or stop doing something, pay money, or make an order that includes any terms or conditions the CRT considers appropriate.

ISSUES

10.   The issues in this dispute are:

a.    Did either party breach the rental agreement?

b.    Is Mr. Koehler entitled to his claimed damages?

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

11.   As the applicant in this civil proceeding, Mr. Koehler must prove his claims on a balance of probabilities, meaning more likely than not. I have read all the parties’ submissions and evidence, but only refer to information I find necessary to explain my decision.

The parties’ rental agreement and implied terms

12.   The parties did not have a written agreement. However, it is undisputed that Mr. Koehler paid Ms. Higginbottom $800 a month to rent a room in her house month-to-month, and I find this was the basis of their verbal agreement.

13.   There is no evidence the parties discussed a notice period for termination of the agreement in advance.

14.   In some circumstances, contractual terms may be implied. Implied terms are terms the parties did not expressly consider, discuss, or write down. Generally, the court (and the CRT) will only imply a term in a rental agreement where it is necessary to give business efficacy to the contract. Such terms are based on the parties’ presumed common intention. In other words, an implied term must be something both parties would have considered obvious when they entered into the agreement (see Zeitler v. Zeitler (Estate), 2010 BCCA 216). I find the parties likely presumed a notice period would be part of their agreement, even if they did not discuss one.

15.   In previous CRT disputes, tribunal members have found there is an implied notice period of one clear month in rental agreements (see, for example, Agyemang v. Paul, 2023 BCCRT 352 and Yovendi v. Francisco, 2024 BCCRT 430). Here, I find one clear month’s notice is reasonable and consistent with the parties’ month-to-month arrangement.

16.   In addition, since the agreement was for a place to live, I find it included an implied term that the parties treat each other respectfully, and not engage in behaviour that made the other person feel unsafe (see, for example, Wells v. Stetsko, 2021 BCCRT 545, and Fortin v. Malcolm, 2023 BCCRT 259).

Did either party breach the rental agreement?

17.   Mr. Koehler moved into the house on January 28, 2024, and started paying rent on February 1. On February 15, Ms. Higginbottom ended the agreement effective immediately. Mr. Koehler moved out that day.

18.   The parties agree that from early on in the tenancy, there was tension between them.

19.   Mr. Koehler says Ms. Higginbottom would get upset about the way he did certain things, and asked him to, for example, use cold water for the laundry, rinse and spray the shower after using it, and not leave wet dishes in the drying rack. Mr. Koehler says he accommodated Ms. Higginbottom’s wishes.

20.   Ms. Higginbottom says Mr. Koehler was rude and disrespectful when she asked him to pick up after himself. She also says he frightened her.

21.   Text messages in evidence show Ms. Higginbottom was unhappy with what she considered Mr. Koehler’s “pissy” attitude. On February 13, she messaged him saying she refused to live with some who was not happy in her space, and that if things continued like this, he could leave at the end of the month. Mr. Koehler answered that as far as his “17-day notice”, he had no choice but to accept Ms. Higginbottom’s offer. The parties both appear to have retreated from their positions later on that evening.

22.   However, the next day, Ms. Higginbottom messaged Mr. Koehler to say she had found the door unlocked for a second time. She told him if it happened again, she would change the locks “way before (his) 17 day notice”.

23.   On February 15, Mr. Koehler says Ms. Higginbottom kicked him out after he responded to her cheery “good morning” with a dry “yeah”. Ms. Higginbottom denies this. She says both that Mr. Koehler stomped past her and came up quickly behind her, startling her. Either way, she says she was scared, and ended the agreement because she felt unsafe.

24.   I find Ms. Higginbottom’s decision to immediately terminate the agreement was a breach of the implied one-month notice period.

25.   While Ms. Higginbottom says Mr. Koehler caused her to feel scared, I find one instance of startling someone as described here is an insufficient reason to end a tenancy without notice.

26.   As for leaving the door unlocked, the evidence shows Ms. Higginbottom only advised Mr. Koehler about this once, the day before she asked him to leave, and warned him of the consequences if he did it again. I find this shows it is unlikely Ms. Higginbottom ended the agreement on February 15 because Mr. Koehler’s actions in leaving the door unlocked on two occasions frightened her so much. Even when considered together, I find the stomping or startling and the unlocked door are no justification for ending the tenancy without the required notice.

Is Mr. Koehler entitled to his claimed damages?

27.   Damages for breach of contract are generally meant to put the innocent party in the position they would have been in had the contract been performed (see Water’s Edge Resort v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 BCCA 319 at paragraph 39).

28.   Here, I find Ms. Higginbottom’s actions caused Mr. Koehler to lose the benefit of half a month’s rent. So, I find he is entitled to $400 for that. However, Mr. Koehler provided no evidence he lost $208 in income because he had to move out immediately, so I dismiss that part of his claim. Finally, I dismiss Mr. Koehler’s claim for $800. Had Ms. Higginbottom given him the required notice, Mr. Koehler would have had to pay $800 for the following month’s rent anyway, so I find he did not suffer a loss for that.

29.   In sum, I order Ms. Higginbottom to pay Mr. Koehler $400 in damages.

INTEREST, CRT FEES AND DISPUTE-RELATED EXPENSES

30.   The Court Order Interest Act applies to the CRT. However, Mr. Koehler specifically waives his entitlement to pre-judgment interest, so I order none.

31.    Under CRTA section 49 and the CRT rules, the CRT will generally order an unsuccessful party to reimburse a successful party for CRT fees and reasonable dispute-related expenses. Though I only awarded Mr. Koehler part of his claimed damages, he was successful on the main issue, so I find he is entitled to reimbursement of $125 for his CRT fees. Neither party claims dispute-related expenses.

ORDERS

32.   Within 30 days of the date of this decision, I order Ms. Higginbottom to pay Mr. Koehler a total of $525, broken down as follows:

a.    $400 in damages, and

b.    $125 in CRT fees.

33.   Mr. Koehler is entitled to post-judgment interest, as applicable.

34.   This is a validated decision and order. Under section 58.1 of the CRTA, a validated copy of the CRT’s order can be enforced through the Provincial Court of British Columbia. Once filed, a CRT order has the same force and effect as an order of the Provincial Court of British Columbia.