Date Issued: August 9, 2019

File: ST-2018-003401

Type: Strata

Civil Resolution Tribunal

Indexed as: Wall et al. v. Rimmer et al., 2019 BCCRT 956

Between:

Beryl Wall and Richard Wall

ApplicantS

And:

Linda Anne Rimmer and The Owners, Strata Plan VIS 3593

RespondentS

And:

Richard Wall and Beryl Wall

RespondentS BY COUNTERLCAIM

REASONS FOR DECISION
Tribunal Member:	David Jiang

INTRODUCTION

1.      This dispute concerns neighbors in a bare land strata property. The applicants and respondents by counterclaim, Richard Wall and Beryl Wall (the Walls), own strata lot B (SLB) in the respondent strata corporation, The Owners, Strata Plan VIS 3593 (strata). The other respondent, and applicant by counterclaim, Linda Anne Rimmer, owns strata lot A (SLA). SLA and SLB are the only strata lots shown in the strata plan.

2.      The Walls claim that Ms. Rimmer permitted an occupant of SLA to aggressively prune trees, bushes, and construct an unsightly fence within 10 feet of the common boundary separating SLA and SLB. They request several orders, including an order for Ms. Rimmer to replace the fence with a better one, grow new hedges, and stop removing their mailbox from a mailbox post.

3.      Ms. Rimmer disagrees with these claims. She submits the fence, which is still under construction and replaces an older one, complies with strata bylaws. Ms. Rimmer also says that the fence, hedges, and mailbox post are entirely on SLA. In her counterclaim she requests several orders, including the removal of security cameras on SLB that are visible from SLA, removal of high-frequency noise makers, compensation for reportedly taken fence panels, and orders regarding trespass and the removal of the mailbox post.

4.      The Walls and Ms. Rimmer are self-represented. The strata is represented by Ms. Rimmer.

JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE

5.      These are the formal written reasons of the Civil Resolution Tribunal (tribunal). The tribunal has jurisdiction over strata property claims brought under section 121 of the Civil Resolution Tribunal Act (Act). The tribunal’s mandate is to provide dispute resolution services accessibly, quickly, economically, informally, and flexibly. In resolving disputes, the tribunal must apply principles of law and fairness, and recognize any relationships between parties to a dispute that will likely continue after the dispute resolution process has ended.

6.      The tribunal has discretion to decide the format of the hearing, including by writing, telephone, videoconferencing, email, or a combination of these. I decided to hear this dispute through written submissions because I find that there are no significant issues of credibility or other reasons that might require an oral hearing.

7.      The tribunal may accept as evidence information that it considers relevant, necessary and appropriate, whether or not the information would be admissible in a court of law. The tribunal may also ask questions of the parties and witnesses and inform itself in any other way it considers appropriate.

8.      Under section 123 of the Act and the tribunal rules, in resolving this dispute the tribunal may make order a party to do or stop doing something, order a party to pay money, order any other terms or conditions the tribunal considers appropriate.

9.      Ms. Rimmer submits that she may have a claim under the Privacy Act, due to certain video cameras located on SLB overlooking SLA. However, section 4 of the Privacy Act states that actions under that statute must be heard and determined by the BC Supreme Court. Further, as noted in Ari v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, 2015 BCCA 468 at paragraph 9, there is no common law cause of action for breach of privacy in BC. I therefore refuse to resolve any claims for breach of privacy in this dispute.

10.   Ms. Rimmer also seeks the imposition of strata fines regarding the placement of certain cameras on SLB and the noise being emitted from three ultrasonic noisemakers. These noisemakers are used to drive away pests through sound. As I shall explain below, there is evidence they also affect a member of Ms. Rimmer’s family. As noted in Terry v. The Owners, Strata Plan NW 309, 2016 BCCA 449, a strata may impose a fine on an owner for a bylaw contravention if the requirements of section 135 of the Strata Property Act (SPA) are strictly met. However, as the tribunal is not the strata, I am unable to order such fines. I refuse to resolve these claims.

11.   The Walls ask that the tribunal impose one or more fines of $10,000 under section 92(1) of the Act against Ms. Rimmer and three other individuals that provided evidence in this dispute. They say that these individuals provided false and misleading evidence as they wrongly accused the Walls of theft. Section 92(1) states that a person is liable for such fine “on conviction”. As I do not have the authority to convict under the Act, I refuse to resolve this claim.

ISSUES

12.   The Walls raise the following issues. Should Ms. Rimmer be ordered to

a.    replace the fence on SLA near the common boundary with a better one one;

b.    grow new hedges near the common boundary;

c.    refrain from further damaging a pine tree;

d.    relocate her RV and motor boat to the south end of SLA; or

e.    reinstall SLB’s mailbox, and remove newly installed posts and water cannons along the driveway?

13.   Ms. Rimmer raises the following issues in her counterclaim. Should the Walls be ordered to

a.    remove the mailbox post and fill in the resulting hole;

b.    stop trespassing;

c.    remove all cameras on SLB visible from SLA;

d.    remove all high-pitched noisemakers from SLB; or

e.    pay $600 to replace missing fence panels?

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

14.   In a civil claim such as this, the owner bears the burden of proof, on a balance of probabilities. I have only addressed the evidence and arguments to the extent necessary to explain my decision.

15.   The strata was created in January 1995, under the Condominium Act, a predecessor to the current SPA.

Replacement of Fence Near the Boundary of SLA and SLB

16.   The Walls say Ms. Rimmer permitted an unsightly fence to be built. They say that the fence should be replaced with a more attractive fence that lets through light, standing at an agreed-upon height. In his April 30, 2019 affidavit, BR, Ms. Rimmer’s spouse, states that he began building the new fence at issue to replace the current fence.

17.   The strata plan shows that the strata is a rectangular lot divided by a straight line (the common boundary) running diagonally down from north to south, from west to east. The common boundary is a line on the strata plan and has no width.

18.   SLB is the north half of the property and SLA is the south half. Aside from a relatively small area in the northwest corner of the plan, there is no common or limited common property. Ms. Rimmer provided photos of the fence. These photos show survey line markers and the fence standing within the boundaries of SLA. Based on the evidence and submissions before me, I find that the fence at issue is located entirely on SLA.

19.   I have considered if there is a legal basis for ordering replacement of the fence. Bylaw amendments in a Schedule of Restrictions were filed in February 1995. On January 1, 2002, the Standard Bylaws in the SPA became the statutory bylaws for every strata corporation BC, regardless of the date the corporation was created. These Standard Bylaws prevail, except to the extent that a strata corporation has already dealt with the same subject matter by previously passing an amended bylaw that is filed in the Land Title Office.

20.   In these circumstances, section 120(1) of the SPA and Strata Property Regulation 17.11 provide that the SPA’s Standard Bylaws applies. The registered Schedule of Restrictions also applies.

21.   Section 5(1)(e) of the Standard Bylaws states than a strata lot owner must normally obtain written approval from the strata to alter a fence. However, section 5(3) exempts strata lots in a bare land strata plan from requiring such permission. The Walls submit that Ms. Rimmer needed to their consent before constructing the new fence. While obtaining consent might have been prudent, I do not find this to be a legal requirement under the Standard Bylaws.

22.   The Schedule of Restrictions does not mention fences. However, section 2 states, in part, that no improvement shall be allowed to fall into disrepair, become unsightly, or untidy. Section 2 also states that the purpose of this restriction is to make sure the lands and improvements of the strata plan be maintained in a “neat and attractive state and condition”.

23.   I have therefore considered if the fence at issue is unsightly, untidy, or in a state of disrepair. The parties provided photos of the fence. It is made of wood and appears new and either unpainted or stained with a wood finish. There is no space between the fence pickets and the fence therefore appears to provide maximal privacy. The Walls provided a photo showing a markedly weathered section of the fence, but I find this to be a part of the pre-existing fence that has been or will be replaced. In that regard, Ms. Rimmer explains that the fence is still under construction.

24.   I find that the fence at issue is not objectively unsightly, untidy, or in a state of disrepair. In the photos before me I found nothing noteworthy about the fence. I acknowledge the Walls’ submission that the fence is poorly constructed and unsightly. However, few specifics were provided. In the photos, there are no observable blemishes or gaps in the pickets. The new fence appears straight. The only sections that are arguably in a state of disrepair are those that are being replaced.

25.   The Walls also submit that the fence contravenes municipal bylaw height restrictions. Ms. Rimmer disagrees and submits it is resolving the issue with the municipality. She further submits that in any event, this only concerns a small section of the fence that is on a slope. In my view this is a matter for the municipality to determine and I make no finding about it.

26.   In summary, I find the fence at issue does not contravene the strata’s bylaws. I dismiss this claim.

Growing New Hedges

27.   The Walls submit that in September 2017, an occupant of SLB overly pruned hedges within 10 feet of the common boundary between SLA and SLB. They provided a diagram that shows a group of hedges in the northwest corner, bordering common property, and more hedges running along the common boundary diagonally separating SLA and SLB. In his April 30, 2019 affidavit, BR states that he did most or all of the pruning in question.

28.   Section 4 of the Schedule of Restrictions states that no trees or bushes growing within 10 feet of the common boundary between SLA and SLB shall be removed without the express written consent of the other owner. I find that the hedges at issue are within 10 feet of the boundary, based on the photos before me.

29.   Ms. Rimmer submits that she only pruned the hedges without removing any of them. The Walls submit that BR pruned so much of the hedges, particularly at their base, that it is equivalent to removal under section 4 of the Schedule of Restrictions.

30.   Having considered the submissions and the evidence, including the various photographs, I find that Ms. Rimmer has not removed any hedges in contravention of the strata bylaws. They are still present. There is also no evidence that they have been damaged to the point that they must be removed.

31.   The Walls provided submissions and pictures about the density and strength of the hedges. Several pictures show the hedges on SLA covered in snow. The hedges are bent over due to the weight of the snow and hang over the fence on SLA into SLB. In other photos the hedges are shown tied with rope to hold them up.

32.   While I acknowledge this evidence, I was not provided any evidence that it would be unusual for hedges to bend from accumulated snow or to require tying up. There is also no indication that removing the snow would not stop the bending.

33.   The Walls say that the pruning has destroyed their privacy, decreased the property value of SLB, and resulted in a displeasing view of an RV parked on SLA. However, I disagree as the above-mentioned fence largely obscures the hedges. The Walls also did not provide any evidence to support any changes in SLB’s property value. As to the view of the RV, I shall discuss that in further detail below.

34.   The Walls also submit that the hedges are common property under the SPA. Under section 6(1) of the Standard Bylaws, an owner must obtain written approval from the strata before altering the common property, limited common property, or common assets.

35.   Common property is defined in section 1(1) of the SPA. It includes that part of the land and buildings shown on a strata plan that is not part of a strata lot, and pipes, wires, cables, chutes, ducts, and other facilities for the passage or provision of water, sewage, gas, and other similar services. Common assets are defined to include personal property held by or on behalf of the strata.

36.   I find the hedges at issue are not common property. The strata plan does not show that the hedges, or the area the hedges are on, are common property. Although the Schedule of Restrictions mentions bushes, there is no indication in the evidence that the strata owns them, so I find the hedges are not a common asset.

37.   In summary, I find Ms. Rimmer has not removed any hedges or bushes contrary to the strata’s bylaws. I dismiss this claim.

The Pine Tree

38.   The Walls say BR damaged a pine tree by pruning it. They submit that they do not want further damage to the pine tree, which is currently holding up the new fence. They also say the pruning makes Ms. Rimmer’s parked RV more visible to them.

39.   Ms. Rimmer submits that the pine tree is on her property, and was trimmed in order to ensure its branches did not damage her shed, nearby power lines, or her RV. The Walls provided a diagram that appears consistent with these submissions. It shows that the pine tree stands on SLA, close to the common boundary, and also close to both a shed and the area where Ms. Rimmer normally parks her RV.

40.   I find that the analysis that applies to the hedges similarly applies to the pine tree. In the photos in evidence, some of the tree’s lower branches have been cut and there is some dispute over who removed which branches. However, the tree has clearly not been removed. I find that the pruning, as shown in the photographs, does not contravene section 4 of the Schedule of Restrictions.

41.   The Walls submit that Ms. Rimmer seeks to kill the pine tree but I find that the evidence before me does not support this. There is no indication that the tree is currently ill.

42.   In summary, I find Ms. Rimmer has not removed the pine tree contrary to the strata’s bylaws. I dismiss this claim.

Relocating the RV and Motor Boat to the South of End of SLA

43.   The Walls say that the RV should be ordered moved because it is parked within 10 feet of the common boundary. The strata bylaws do not prohibit parking within 10 feet of the common boundary.

44.   I find it unclear what legal basis the Walls rely upon for the requested order. However, I note that section 2 of the Schedule of Restrictions provides that no person shall create a nuisance in a strata lot. Similarly, section 3(1) of the Standard Bylaws states that an owner must not use a strata lot in a way that causes a nuisance, or unreasonably interferes with the rights of other persons to use and enjoy the common property, common assets, or another strata lot.

45.   The Walls dislike the appearance of the RV. As noted in Bourque et al v. McKnight et al, 2017 BCCRT 26 at paragraph 106, in a strata dispute, aesthetic appearance, including the unreasonable obstruction of a view, may well be relevant in considering whether something is either a nuisance or an unreasonable interference with the rights of others.

46.   I have reviewed several photos of the RV. It appears to be in a state of good repair and is parked behind Ms. Rimmer’s fence and the pine tree, on SLA. On the other side of the RV is a road and other houses. When viewed from SLB, the RV therefore does not appear to block any particular scenic view and the RV itself is largely concealed by the fence and pine tree. I do not find the appearance of the parked RV to meaningfully contribute to it being either a nuisance or unreasonable interference with the rights of the Walls.

47.   The Walls also submit that the RV is parked close against the hedges in that area and is damaging them. It is not self-evident why contact with the RV would be harmful and I was not provided any expert evidence that this would harm the bushes. Further, the hedges at issue are owned by Ms. Rimmer.

48.   The Walls also say the RV blocks utilities access for Telus and BC Hydro. The Walls provided photos and a video (without audio) of Telus workers walking around the RV. However, this evidence does not actually show if the RV affected their ability to provide services. As there is no evidence from either Telus or BC Hydro on this issue, I do not find it likely that the RV prevents utility workers from doing any needed work.

49.   The Walls also submit that a motor boat should be moved. The Walls say that the RV, in combination with the parked motor boat and other vehicles parked in the northwest corner of SLA, cause water to pool excessively along the common boundary. However, it is not clear to me why these vehicles would cause water to pool along the boundary, rather than where they are parked. The Walls did not explain this in their submissions. I do not find that the locations of the RV or motor boat contribute to excessive water pooling.

50.   In summary, I find the parked RV and motor boat do not create a nuisance under section 2 of the Schedule of Restrictions or section 3(1) of the Standard Bylaws. I also find that that the RV and motor boat do not unreasonably interfere with the Walls’ use or enjoyment of their strata lot under section 3(1). I dismiss this claim.

The Mailbox, Newly Installed Posts, and Water Cannons – Claim and Counterclaim

51.   The Walls claim that Ms. Rimmer wrongfully removed the Walls’ mailbox, leaving a bare mailbox post. They seek an order for the mailbox to be replaced.

52.   Ms. Rimmer says that the mailbox and its post are on SLA and that the Walls have no legal right to place their mailbox there. Ms. Rimmer counterclaims for an order that the Walls remove the mailbox post and fill in the resulting hole.

53.   Ms. Rimmer provided a diagram showing the mailbox in the northwest corner of SLA. The mailbox is close to a boundary line dividing SLA from the common property, rather than the boundary line separating SLA from SLB. A title search does not show any registered easements that would permit the presence of the mailbox.

54.   Ms. Rimmer submits that the Walls were warned in November 2017 that the mailbox would have to be moved for construction of the new fence. As the mailbox was not moved, Ms. Rimmer took the mailbox off its post and put it on SLB. Since then, the Walls have repeatedly placed the mailbox on Ms. Rimmer’s fence without permission. Based on the photos provided by Ms. Rimmer, at the current time it appears that only a mailbox post remains on SLA.

55.   Ms. Rimmer also provided photos taken on April 1, 2018. The photos show a yellow string tied to a stake that Ms. Rimmer says shows the property line between SLA and the common property. The mailbox stands entirely on SLA. The photo also shows a white string attached to a lone fencepost. The owner says that the string is the expected path of new fence construction and the photo shows that the mailbox is in the path of the planned fence on SLA.

56.   The Walls disagree that the mailbox is on SLA but provided few details. Given the survey markers shown in the above-mentioned photos, on balance, I find that the mailbox at issue was on SLA and the bare mailbox post currently stands on SLA.

57.   In a previous letter counsel for the Walls claimed that the mailbox should stay due to an implied easement. Section 69 of the SPA deals with implied easements. Section 69(1)(b) provides that such easements exist for the passage or provision of certain services (such as water and electricity) through pipes, wires, cables, chutes, or ducts. Given the wording and provided examples of that section, I am unable to stretch such an easement to include picking up mail from a mailbox. Section 69(1)(c) provides an implied easement “for shelter” but section 69(5) states that such easements do not apply to strata lots in a bare land strata plan, which is the case here. I therefore find that no implied easement exists that would assist the Walls in this portion of their claim.

58.   The Walls submit that in any event, the mailbox should be allowed to stay at its previous location. They say that the mailbox was previously in the disputed area for many years. I therefore considered whether the doctrine of proprietary estoppel could apply. As noted in Cowper‑Smith v. Morgan, 2017 SCC 61, proprietary estoppel may arise when

a.    a party represents that the claimant will have some right or benefit over property;

b.    the claimant relies on the expectation by doing something in reasonable reliance of the representations; and

c.    the claimant suffers a detriment because of this reasonable reliance, such that it would be unjust for the party responsible for the representation to go back on their word.

59.   In this case the Walls submit that they did not put their mailbox in the disputed location and that it stood there previously for at least 24 years.

60.   While I acknowledge this submission, it shows that the Walls did not rely upon any representations by Ms. Rimmer to place the mailbox on SLA. According to the title search in evidence, Ms. Rimmer gained ownership of SLA in 2006. Based on the submissions before me, the mailbox had already been there for many years.

61.   There is no indication that Ms. Rimmer was aware that the mailbox was on her property until she began building her new fence in 2017. There is no written evidence that Ms. Rimmer represented to the Walls that they could keep their mailbox on SLA. All specific representations have been to the contrary.

62.   Given the above, I find that Ms. Rimmer does not need to place the mailbox back on the post. The Walls submits that Ms. Rimmer should also remove newly installed posts along the driveway and remove water cannons. I was not provided any details or basis for this order and I therefore decline to make it. I dismiss these claims.

63.   Ms. Rimmer seeks an order for the Walls to remove the mailbox post and to fill in any resulting hole at their expense. I decline to make that order. The post has been located on SLA both before and after Ms. Rimmer purchased it. I find it to be part of SLA and Ms. Rimmer is at liberty to deal with the mailbox post as she sees fit, at her cost.

64.   In summary, I dismiss the Walls’ claims about the mailbox, the newly installed posts along the driveway, and the water cannons. I also dismiss Ms. Rimmer’s counterclaim about removal of the mailbox post.

Trespass – Counterclaim

65.   Ms. Rimmer claims that the Walls have trespassed by digging in the north side of their yard. Ms. Rimmer relies on the April 30, 2019 affidavit of BR. BR states that on April 3, 2018, he observed movement in the dirt between two hedge trees located on SLA. He saw a hand moving back and forth, as if someone was trying to cover tracks. He did not see the whose hand it was. At some point afterwards, he then saw the Walls standing on their driveway talking.

66.   Ms. Rimmer requests that the tribunal find out why the Walls are digging in her yard and ensure that it stops. I find that the evidence before me does not establish that the Walls trespassed, particularly since BR could not identify whose hand he saw. I dismiss this part of the counterclaim.

Removal of All Cameras from SLB that are Visible from SLA – Counterclaim

67.   Ms. Rimmer submits that the Walls should be ordered to move all cameras visible from SLA to a location not visible from SLA and erase all their video and audio recordings of SLA.

68.   Section 3 of the Schedule of Restrictions states that no one shall place any communications or like equipment, including satellite dishes, that is visible to the other strata lot, to the exterior or any building or anything upon the strata lot. The bylaw provides for an exception if the other owner consents to placement of such equipment, but there is no indication that the exception applies here. Ms. Rimmer submits that video cameras are captured by Section 3 as they are a form of communications, or like, equipment. She notes that communication is defined in a Meriam-Webster dictionary to include “a system for transmitting or exchanging information” and “the technology of the transmission of information”.

69.   While I have considered this submission, I am unable to stretch communications (or like) equipment under the bylaw to include the video cameras at issue without more information. There is no evidence that the cameras are used to broadcast information. I therefore conclude that the bylaw at issue does not govern the use of the cameras in this dispute.

70.   In summary, I find that the video cameras at issue do not contravene section 3 of the Schedule of Restrictions. I dismiss this counterclaim.

Removal of all High-Pitched Noisemakers from SLB and Related Fines – Counterclaim

71.   Ms. Rimmer says that the Walls operate three noisemakers that breach section 3 of the Standard Bylaws, as they create a nuisance, cause unreasonable noise, and unreasonably interfere with her ability to enjoy her property. She submits that the noisemakers create ultrasonic sounds to drive away pest creatures such as rats and raccoons. However, she says that the Walls have used the devices to negatively affect her son, CR.

72.   In a March 29, 2019 affidavit, CR states that he had lived at SLA since 2006. CR first noticed a high-pitched noise in the summer of 2017. It caused his ears and head to hurt and forced him to keep his bedroom window and door shut to keep the sound out. He says the sound was initially constant but is now intermittent. CR’s evidence is supported by an April 1, 2019 letter from a former resident of the area, NG.

73.   The Walls changed the noisemakers to activate only when sensing motion at night as of September 3, 2017. They also turned the ultrasonic settings off entirely and repositioned the devices. This appears consistent with CR’s claim that the sound is now intermittent.

74.   Ms. Rimmer seeks an order for the removal of the noisemakers. As noted earlier, section 3 of the Standard Bylaws prohibits an owner from causing a nuisance, unreasonable noise, or unreasonable interference with the rights of other people to use and enjoy their strata lot or the common property.

75.   Assessing whether noise complaints are reasonable is challenging because what constitutes unreasonable noise can be subjective, making noise violations difficult to prove: Zacharias v. Ludrovsky et al, 2019 BCCRT 188. However, I find that the intermittent noise of the noisemakers violates section 3 of the Standard Bylaws. In reaching this conclusion I place significant weigh upon CR’s evidence that these devices affected his health and continue to negatively affect him.

76.   I acknowledge that the Walls say they purchased the devices to drive away raccoons and other animals. They provided video footage of the raccoons on their property at various times. However, the Walls did not provide evidence showing why using the noisemakers to drive away the raccoons, and potentially other pests, would take priority over CR’s health or the inconvenience it causes him. I find this to be so, even though the Walls took some steps to mitigate the harm done to CR, such as turning off the ultrasonic settings.

77.   Given this, I order that the Walls must remove any ultrasonic noisemakers from SLB. I will provide the Walls 14 days to comply with this order.

Fence Panels – Counterclaim

78.   Ms. Rimmer submits that the Walls removed three sections of the pre-existing fence panels, leaving bare fence posts in their place. BR describes this in his April 30, 2019 affidavit. In a diagram he shows SLA’s fence running parallel with the common boundary. One portion of the diagram shows the fence with an approximately 24-foot-long gap in its middle, with fence posts present but no attached panels.

79.   BR says that he has lived at SLA since 2010. He says he had wondered why the fence had missing sections until he spoke to the previous owners of SLA in September 2017. BR says the previous owners reported that the fence was complete when they owned it, with no gaps. BR also attached an email from DL, one of the previous residents of SLA, that shows similar comments. BR also says that he spoke to the builder of the fence, ST. He reports that ST said he built the fence at issue and that his usual practice would be complete the fence, with no missing sections.

80.   Ms. Rimmer submits that the Walls took down the fence panels at issue. She submits that they had the best opportunity to remove the panels and did not wish to have the fence there.

81.   The Walls disagree and provided photos they say that were taken in May and November 2005 and February 2006, as well as May 2018 pictures showing no marks or screw holes in the posts. The Walls submit this means the missing sections were therefore never missing as no pickets were installed in that area. They also explain that the reason the fence pickets were not installed was because the owners of SLA decided not to proceed, as they did not wish to damage the trees and shrubs in the area.

82.   Given the above, I find the allegation that the Walls removed the fence panels to be speculative. The fact that they could have done it is not sufficient proof to establish theft, on a balance of probabilities. I dismiss this counterclaim.

TRIBUNAL FEES AND DISPUTE-RELATED EXPENSES

83.   Under section 49 of the Act, and the tribunal rules, the tribunal will generally order an unsuccessful party to reimburse a successful party for tribunal fees and reasonable dispute-related expenses. I see no reason in this case to deviate from the general rule.

84.   The Walls requested reimbursement of tribunal fees and dispute-related expenses, including legal fees, totaling $3,595.98. In submissions the Walls also provided a higher figure of $4,218.91. Ms. Rimmer requested reimbursement of tribunal fees of $125.

85.   Both parties were largely unsuccessful. I decline to order tribunal fees or dispute-related expenses for either party. I note that the tribunal does not award a party legal fees as a dispute-related expense except in extraordinary cases. I did not find the circumstances of this case to be extraordinary.

ORDERS

86.   I order that

a.    the Walls’ claims are dismissed;

b.    within 14 days of this decision the Walls must remove all ultrasonic noisemakers from SLB;

c.    Ms. Rimmer’s remaining counterclaims are dismissed.

87.   I refuse to resolve Ms. Rimmer’s claims under the Privacy Act and for the imposition of strata fines under the SPA.

88.   I refuse to resolve the Walls’ claims for the imposition of fines under section 92(1) of the Act.

89.   Under section 57 of the Act, a party can enforce this final tribunal decision by filing, in the Supreme Court of British Columbia, a validated copy of the order, which is attached to this decision. The order can only be filed if, among other things, the time for an appeal under section 123.1 of the Act has expired and leave to appeal has not been sought or consented to. Once filed, a tribunal order has the same force and effect as an order of the Supreme Court of British Columbia.