Date Issued: July 18, 2023

File: ST-2022-001719
ST-2022-005334
ST-2022-005848

Type: Strata

Civil Resolution Tribunal

Indexed as: Jobanputra v. The Owners, Strata Plan VR 911, 2023 BCCRT 602

Between:

SHARMILA JOBANPUTRA

Applicant

And:

The Owners, Strata Plan VR 911

Respondent

REASONS FOR DECISION
Tribunal Member:	Eric Regehr, Vice Chair

INTRODUCTION

1.      Sharmila Jobanputra owns strata lot 2 (known as unit 4) in the strata corporation, The Owners, Strata Plan VR 911 (strata). The strata is comprised of 6 strata lots. In 3 separate Civil Resolution Tribunal (CRT) disputes, Ms. Jobanputra makes wide-ranging allegations about the strata’s compliance with the Strata Property Act (SPA).

2.      First, Ms. Jobanputra alleges that the strata has failed to repair unit 4’s balconies, bathroom, and kitchen. They ask for orders that the strata do certain repairs, which I outline below, and pay a total of $158,670: $420 to paint and adjust a bathroom door, $6,500 in increased electricity costs, $25,000 for compromising the safety of unit 4’s residents, and $126,740 for the loss of unit 4’s property value. The strata says that it has attempted to repair the balconies, but Ms. Jobanputra has refused access. The strata also says that it has reasonably investigated the other issues Ms. Jobanputra raised, and that they are not clearly the strata’s responsibility. 

3.      Ms. Jobanputra also alleges that the strata wrongfully imposed a series of special levies for building repairs. They ask for an order that the strata refund their $30,390 in special levy contributions, plus $60,000 in damages for “economic hardship and stress”. The strata says it complied with the Strata Property Act (SPA) when it raised the special levies at issue.

4.      Ms. Jobanputra also says that the strata has failed to follow the SPA about banking and finances. Specifically, they say the strata has wrongfully permitted its president and treasurer, CB, to pay strata expenses from their personal bank account instead of paying strata fees. They ask for an order that the strata provide “full details” about CB’s personal bank account. They also want an order that the strata require CB to pay outstanding strata fees from 2004 to the present, which Ms. Jobanputra estimates to be over $50,000, and pay strata fees to the strata’s bank account going forward. Ms. Jobanputra also wants the strata to be audited, either by an external auditor or by Ms. Jobanputra (who says they are an accountant). Finally, Ms. Jobanputra asks for a more general order that the strata follow the SPA about banking and finances. They claim $35,000 in damages for the strata’s alleged SPA breaches. The strata admits that its compliance may have been imperfect, but says that any breaches were minor and technical in nature, and that no remedy is warranted.

5.      Ms. Jobanputra also asks for orders that the strata provide certain records under sections 35 and 36 of the SPA. The strata says it has already disclosed everything it is required to, and that Ms. Jobanputra’s requests have been repetitive and unreasonable.

6.      Finally, Ms. Jobanputra alleges that the strata has treated them significantly unfairly in various ways. They ask for $500,000 in damages. The strata denies any unfair treatment.

7.      The strata asks me to dismiss all of Ms. Jobanputra’s claims.

8.      Ms. Johanputra is self-represented. The strata is represented by a council member.

JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE

9.     These are the formal written reasons of the Civil Resolution Tribunal (CRT). The CRT has jurisdiction over strata property claims under section 121 of the Civil Resolution Tribunal Act (CRTA). The CRT’s mandate is to provide dispute resolution services accessibly, quickly, economically, informally, and flexibly. The CRT must act fairly and follow the law. It must also recognize any relationships between dispute parties that will likely continue after the CRT’s process has ended.

10.  The CRT has discretion to decide the format of the hearing, including by writing, telephone, videoconferencing, email, or a combination of these. In some respects, both parties of this dispute call into question the credibility, or truthfulness, of the other. In the circumstances of this dispute, I find that I am properly able to assess and weigh the evidence and submissions before me. I note the decision Yas v. Pope, 2018 BCSC 282, in which the court recognized that oral hearings are not necessarily required where credibility is in issue. Bearing in mind the CRT’s mandate that includes proportionality and a speedy resolution of disputes, I decided to hear this dispute through written submissions.

11.  The CRT may accept as evidence information that it considers relevant, necessary, and appropriate, whether or not the information would be admissible in court. The CRT may also ask the parties and witnesses questions and inform itself in any way it considers appropriate.

12.  Under section 123 of the CRTA and the CRT rules, in resolving this dispute the tribunal may order a party to do or stop doing something, order a party to pay money, or order any other terms or conditions the CRT considers appropriate.

13.  The strata emailed CRT staff 2 pieces of evidence late in the decision process, namely the minutes of the strata’s May 2023 annual general meeting (AGM) and an email chain about those minutes. By the time the strata did this, I had already reviewed all the parties’ evidence and submissions and decided how I would resolve the dispute. Nothing in the strata’s late evidence changed my decision, so I decided not to ask Ms. Jobanputra to provide submissions on the late evidence, as doing so would have needlessly delayed a final decision.

14.  Ms. Jobanputra argues that I should not accept a written statement from one of the other owners, MM, because it contains personal attacks. I find that to the extent that MM’s statement refers to Ms. Jobanputra and their family’s personal and medical history, it is irrelevant. I find it unnecessary to “rule it inadmissible” as Ms. Jobanputra requests because the personal information in the statement played no role in the outcome of this dispute.

15.  Ms. Jobanputra says in her final reply submissions that they want an administrator appointed under section 174 of the SPA. Section 122(1)(i) of the CRTA says that the CRT does not have jurisdiction to appoint an administrator. So, even if this claim had been raised sooner, I would have refused to resolve it.

16.  Finally, Ms. Jobanputra requests a summons under CRT rule 8.2. A summons under the CRT’s rules is something a party can issue during facilitation to obtain relevant evidence. Ms. Jobanputra wants a summons that requires the strata to provide financial information. I decline to refer this dispute back to facilitation to allow for a summons. The strata says it has already provided everything it has, and I fail to see how issuing a summons would result in a different answer. I find that referring the matter back to facilitation to allow Ms. Jobanputra to issue a summons would result in a lengthy delay for no useful purpose.

ISSUES

17.   The issues in this dispute are:

a.     Should I order the strata to do any of the claimed repairs?

b.     Should I order the strata to refund Ms. Jobanputra’s special levies contributions?

c.      Has the strata treated Ms. Jobanputra significantly unfairly?

d.     Should I order the strata to collect unpaid strata fees from CB?

e.     Should I make any orders about the strata’s finances?

f.       Must the strata provide Ms. Jobanputra with any records?

g.     Should I order the strata to pay Ms. Jobanputra damages?

18.  I note that some of Ms. Jobanputra’s claims relate to events from 2018 and before. The strata says that these claims are out of time under the Limitation Act. Given that I have dismissed all of Ms. Jobanputra’s claims from 2018 and before on their merits, I decided not to consider the Limitation Act.

BACKGROUND

19.  In a civil claim such as this, Ms. Jobanputra as the applicant must prove their case on a balance of probabilities. While I have read all the parties’ evidence and submissions, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision.

20.  The strata consists of 6 strata lots in a 4-floor building. Strata lot 1 is the only strata lot on the ground floor. Strata lots 2, 3, 4, and 5 are each 2-storey strata lots on the building’s second and third floors. These strata lots each have 2 limited common property balconies, one on each floor. The materials sometimes refer to the balconies as decks, but I will use the term balcony to match the language in the strata plan. Strata lot 6 is the only strata lot on the top floor. I note that since the strata lot and unit numbers do not match up, I will use the unit numbers to describe the strata lots.

21.  The strata has no filed bylaws, so I find the Standard Bylaws under the SPA apply.

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

 Should I order the strata to do any of the claimed repairs?

22.   Ms. Jobanputra’s repair claims can be broken down into 3 distinct issues: the balconies, the upstairs ensuite bathroom, and the kitchen. The same legal principles apply to each claim.

23.   Section 72 of the SPA requires the strata to repair and maintain common property, including limited common property. This obligation is reflected in Standard Bylaw 8. The strata does not dispute that it is responsible for repairing and maintaining common property, including the limited common property balconies.

24.   To fulfill its repair and maintenance obligations, the strata must act reasonably. The starting point for analyzing the strata’s decisions is deference because the strata must balance competing interests and work within a budget the owners can afford. So, the strata may prioritize some repairs over others. The strata may also choose a more conservative “good” repair option over the “best”, most expensive repair option. See Weir v. The Owners, Strata Plan NW 17, 2010 BCSC 784. The reasonableness of the strata’s repair decisions must be assessed based on what the strata knew when it made the decision, not with the benefit of hindsight. See Slosar v. The Owners, Strata Plan KAS 2846, 2021 BCSC 1174.

25.   Strata corporations are governed by strata council volunteers who are not expected to have expertise in building maintenance or repair. For that reason, the strata is entitled to hire and rely on experts to give advice, make recommendations, and undertake repairs. See Slosar.

26.   With those general principles in mind, I turn to the 3 individual repair claims.

 

The Balconies

27.   The dispute about unit 4’s balconies relates to a series of projects aimed at eliminating water ingress and rot issues in the strata. The first of these projects related to an exterior leak outside unit 3 on the building’s east side. At a May 2018 AGM, the strata approved an initial budget of $11,000 for these repairs, with $5,000 from the strata’s cash reserves and $6,000 via a special levy. The minutes indicate that the owners knew the project might cost more, and the strata said it would provide 2 weeks’ notice for any further special levies if and when they became necessary. I discuss the strata’s compliance with the SPA when raising special levies below.

28.   As the strata’s contractor, AS, performed their work around unit 3, they uncovered more extensive rot. The project ended up taking the rest of 2018 and cost a total of $74,952.47.

29.   During their work, AS told the strata it would need to do further repair work in other parts of the strata, including unit 4’s upper balcony, because of water ingress and rot issues. On October 18, 2018, AS provided several estimates for this work. The strata held a special general meeting (SGM) on November 1, 2018, and approved a $69,952.50 special levy for this work, which the strata intended to complete in phases.

30.   In November 2018, AS completed some limited work in and around unit 4 as part of the first phase. However, in December, AS told the strata they did not want to continue with the project, leaving the strata without a contractor.

31.   Nothing further happened until the strata’s May 2019 AGM. The strata began the search for a new contractor to do the work. Over the summer, the strata obtained quotes and identified a preferred contractor, but it appears from the evidence that the strata or contractor ran out of time to start the project that year. 

32.   At the May 2020 AGM, the owners decided to postpone the repairs until the following year because of uncertainty around COVID-19 (some of the work needed to be done indoors). At the May 2021 AGM, the owners decided to hire a new contractor, Solution Renovations, and to further postpone the work to 2022. There is no evidence that Ms. Jobanputra objected to these postponements.

33.   The project ultimately began with unit 5’s repairs in January and February 2022. The strata planned to do repairs for units 2 and 4 that summer, starting with unit 2.

34.   On March 22, 2022, Solution Renovations provided the strata with a written report of their inspection of unit 4. The report said there was no sign of rot in the upper balcony door, no rot on the wobbly railing, and no rot on the balcony or adjacent stucco. The report recommended replacing the balcony door’s exterior trim and weather stripping, painting and adjusting the door, screwing or nailing the loose railing, and cleaning the balcony.

35.   After receiving this report, Ms. Jobanputra retained 2 contractors, including Incredible Restorations, to assess unit 4’s balconies (among other things). Both recommended more extensive repairs than Solution Renovations, although their recommendations were not identical. Ms. Jobanputra provided these reports to the strata.

36.   The owners approved a $40,000 special levy at a June 2022 SGM for unit 2 and unit 4’s repairs. The minutes indicate that the strata would proceed with unit 4’s balcony repairs once Ms. Jobanputra agreed to dates. The strata noted that if a “black burn mark” on the balcony was due to owner damage, it would seek reimbursement from Ms. Jobanputra.

37.   In late July 2022, the Solution Renovations inspected unit 4 to confirm a scope of work. On August 4, 2022, Solution Renovations provided a report indicating that it would “fix/replace” railings on both balconies and the stucco on the upper balcony “as required”. The report also said Solution Renovations would replace the upper balcony’s vinyl and install a new door and frame. These are more extensive repairs than Solution Renovations had initially proposed in March 2022.

38.   On August 3, 2022, CB emailed Ms. Jobanputra that Solution Renovations would be able to start work the following week. Ms. Jobanputra emailed back that they had anticipated the work being done in September, and that “this month will not work for me”, without explaining why not. Ms. Jobanputra later said they did not want the balcony repairs to proceed because the strata had not agreed to do any bathroom or kitchen repairs. The strata agreed to postpone. I note that the strata’s decision was a courtesy. I say this because Standard Bylaw 7 requires Ms. Jobanputra to allow the strata and its contractors to enter on 48 hours’ written notice to repair and maintain common property. In other words, Ms. Jobanputra’s consent was not required.

39.   On August 31, 2022, Ms. Jobanputra emailed CB asking about a start date. CB asked if Ms. Jobanputra was prepared to have just the balconies fixed, contrary to their previous position. Ms. Jobanputra agreed work could begin September 7.

40.   On September 2, 2022, CB emailed Ms. Jobanputra that work would begin on the balconies sometime after September 7. On September 4, Ms. Jobanputra emailed asking that the strata postpone the work for “a couple of months” due to an unspecified family emergency. Ms. Jobanputra also wanted the strata to commit to a broader scope of work. CB responded acknowledging Ms. Jobanputra’s request and said that due to contractor availability, it may not be possible to immediately start work when it suited Ms. Jobanputra. The strata has not committed to a specific scope of work, instead deferring to Solution Renovations. The strata told Ms. Jobanputra that the repairs would be done “to building standard”. To date, no repairs have been done.

41.   Ms. Jobanputra argues that the strata has failed to repair and maintain common property. Their main argument is that the strata’s planned scope of repairs is inadequate based on Incredible Restorations’s recommendation for more comprehensive repairs. However, as mentioned above, the strata is entitled to rely on its contractor to determine the scope of work. The strata may choose a more conservative approach to the repairs. There is no suggestion that Solution Renovations is unqualified to do the work, or to assess what work is necessary. To the extent that Ms. Jobanputra relies on the fact that there were more comprehensive repairs around units 2, 3 and 5, I find that the strata is entitled to do only the work necessary to stop the water ingress issues. The fact that other areas in the strata were in worse shape is not evidence that the strata’s planned repairs to unit 4 are unreasonable. Ms. Jobanputra also argues that the strata should insist on a more comprehensive written contract and obtain competitive quotes. I find these matters are within the strata’s discretion.

42.   The other issue is delay. I acknowledge that the strata first identified the need for balcony repairs in late 2018. However, there is nothing to suggest that the balcony repairs were urgent such that it was unreasonable to delay the project in 2020 and 2021. It is also true that once the project was underway, the strata did unit 2 and 5’s repairs first. There is no evidence that doing the repairs in that order was unreasonable. In fact, the strata’s prioritization decisions were primarily driven by when unit 2 and unit 5’s residents would be away on extended trips, as they preferred not to be home for the repairs. I find this was a sensible approach to deciding the order of repairs.

43.   Since the summer of 2022, I find that the ongoing delay is due to Ms. Jobanputra’s unreasonable behaviour. I agree with the strata that it should not be held responsible for these delays. As mentioned above, it is the strata’s responsibility to repair and maintain common property. The strata does not need Ms. Jobanputra’s approval and Ms. Jobanputra has no right to direct the scope or timing of the repairs. See Swan v. The Owners, Strata Plan LMS 410, 2018 BCCRT 241. In short, I find that if Ms. Jobanputra had acted reasonably, the balcony repairs would likely already be complete.

44.   It is apparent from the strata’s submissions that it remains committed to completing the repairs in keeping with Solution Renovations’ recommendations. Given that the parties’ ongoing disagreement has delayed necessary repairs, I find it appropriate to order the strata to do them even though it does not dispute this obligation. I order the strata to conduct repairs to unit 4’s 2 balconies in keeping with Solution Renovations’ recommendations or the recommendations of another qualified contractor the strata may retain. I set out the timeline for those repairs below. Section 48(1) of the CRTA allows me to place any terms and conditions I deem necessary to give effect to my order. Under that authority, and because of Ms. Jobanputra’s past refusal to allow the repairs to proceed, I order Ms. Jobanputra to permit access on 48 hours’ written notice and to otherwise cooperate with the repairs.

45.   I dismiss Ms. Jobanputra’s claim for any specific repairs to be done. I also dismiss their claim for $6,500 in damages for increased electricity costs. This claim is based on Ms. Jobanputra’s allegation that the strata’s failure to fix a balcony door made it difficult (and therefore more expensive) to heat unit 4. Since I have found that the strata’s actions were reasonable, there is no basis to award these damages.

46.   Ms. Jobanputra also argues that the strata’s decision to hire AS was unreasonable for various reasons. However, they provided no evidence that a different contractor would have completed the project for less or that any of AS’s work was substandard.

The Bathroom

47.   On October 31, 2018, Ms. Jobanputra emailed the other owners that they wanted a leak fixed in their upstairs ensuite bathroom. There were undisputedly water stains on the bathroom’s ceiling. On November 1, 2018, CB emailed the owners that AS had inspected unit 4 and advised the water stains were from interior moisture. AS recommended using the bathroom fan longer and repainting.

48.   Ms. Jobanputra did not raise the issue again until 2022, when they asked the strata to include bathroom repairs as part of the overall repair project. This was based on Ms. Jobanputra’s belief that there was an external leak causing the moisture problem. The strata declined to include any bathroom repairs in unit 4 because AS told the strata it was an owner issue and not a strata issue. On March 2, 2022, Ms. Jobanputra emailed the owners that AS was not qualified to assess the moisture problem.  

49.   The strata had Solution Renovations include the bathroom in its inspection of unit 4. Solution Renovations’ March 22, 2022 report said there was no moisture detected in the bathroom ceiling and no evidence of an exterior leak. Solution Renovations concluded the mold and moisture were the result of poor ventilation and recommended running the fan “24/7”.  

50.   Incredible Restorations’ March 24, 2022 report noted moisture and mold in the bathroom, which it said could be from the rooftop deck or a water line behind the shower wall. They said they would need to demolish the shower walls to be sure of the moisture’s source. In a later email, Incredible Restorations also recommended that an HVAC technician look at the bathroom fan. Ms. Jobanputra also hired a second contractor to inspect unit 4’s bathroom but their report did not include an opinion about the moisture’s likely source.

51.   At an April 13, 2022 strata council meeting, Ms. Jobanputra shared the Incredible Restorations report with the strata. The minutes indicate there was a “broad ranging discussion” about unit 4. The strata agreed to hire a contractor to perform exploratory work to investigate. However, it demanded Ms. Jobanputra reimburse the strata for the investigation costs if the issue ended up being their responsibility. Ms. Jobanputra did not agree to this condition, so no investigation has been done.

52.   In Solution Renovations’ August 4, 2022 report, it reiterated its opinion that the moisture was an “owner issue” and recommended cleaning and painting the ceiling and installing a new fan.

53.   Ms. Jobanputra argues that the reports in evidence establish that the bathroom moisture is likely coming from the balcony above or internal walls. I do not agree. The reports are contradictory, and Incredible Restorations’ report does no more than raise the possibility that there is a common property issue causing the moisture. The report acknowledges that it is impossible to know for sure without further investigation, some of which could be intrusive. Incredible Restorations later said in an email to another owner that the first investigative step should be having an HVAC technician inspect the ducting above the bathroom.

54.   In Barros-Harty v. The Owners, Strata Plan NW 962, 2022 BCCRT 569, another CRT vice chair found that a strata corporation’s duty to repair and maintain common property includes a duty to investigate possible common property issues. I agree with this conclusion. As with other aspects of its duty to repair and maintain common property, the strata must act reasonably when deciding whether to investigate. What is reasonable in the circumstances depends on the likelihood that the strata will need to undertake repairs, the cost of the investigation, and the gravity of harm to be avoided. See Guenther v. Owners, Strata Plan KAS431, 2011 BCSC 119, at paragraph 40.

55.   In this dispute, it is clear that the strata has been skeptical that the moisture’s source was common property. I find that this was reasonable until the strata received Incredible Restorations’ report, and later spoke to the author. I find that Incredible Restorations’ report pointed to the possibility of an external water source, which I find was significant in the context of the strata’s ongoing major projects to address this issue. I find that the moisture had caused mold growth in unit 4’s bathroom.

56.   The Standard Bylaws do not include a bylaw that would allow the strata to charge back such investigation costs to an owner. So, I find the strata must pay for the investigation regardless of what it ultimately reveals. I find that the strata acted unreasonably when it demanded that Ms. Jobanputra agree to pay for the investigation if the moisture’s source was not the strata’s responsibility. I order the strata to retain a qualified person to investigate the cause of the excessive moisture in unit 4’s ensuite bathroom, at its expense, within 60 days of this decision. The strata retains discretion about how to prioritize the different investigation options that the various contractors have suggested. The strata’s obligation to investigate continues only until it either identifies the moisture’s source or rules out that the moisture’s source is the strata’s responsibility. I dismiss Ms. Jobanputra’s claim that the strata undertake any specific repairs.

57.   I also dismiss Ms. Jobanputra’s damages claim to the extent it relates to the upstairs bathroom. While Ms. Jobanputra alleges that they have reduced their use of the bathroom, I find the evidence does not establish that it was necessary to stop using it. While the mold is unsightly, I find that Ms. Jobanputra has not suffered a compensable loss with respect to the bathroom.

58.   I also dismiss Ms. Jobanputra’s $420 claim for painting the bathroom and adjusting its door. There is no evidence to support the expense. Ms. Jobanputra says that they did not keep any documents about the repairs because they did not think they would ever need it. While that may be true, Ms. Jobanputra bears the burden of proving their claims, and I find they have not proven this claim.

The Kitchen

59.   On June 24, 2022, Ms. Jobanputra reported a leak in their kitchen light fixture. According to its August 4, 2022 report, Solution Renovations took moisture readings on separate days, detecting moisture on one day but not another. The report said that the water’s source was likely spillover from the tub in the upstairs bathroom in unit 4.

60.   On September 1, 2022, Incredible Restorations emailed Ms. Jobanputra that the moisture could be coming from a drainpipe or a supply line in the ceiling. Incredible Restorations did not comment on the possibility of tub spillover, possibly because Ms. Jobanputra had told Incredible Restorations that they never used the bathroom. In this dispute, Ms. Jobanputra admits that their family uses the bathroom at least occasionally, which I find is consistent with Incredible Restorations’ photos that show about a dozen bottles of shower and bath products along the bathtub’s edge. The timing and frequency of Ms. Jobanputra’s family’s use of this bathroom is unclear.

61.   The strata has consistently told Ms. Jobanputra that they must hire their own plumber to investigate the leak, and the strata will only intervene if those investigations reveal an issue that is the strata’s responsibility to repair. As mentioned above, the strata must investigate only if certain conditions are met. Unlike with the bathroom moisture, I find that Ms. Jobanputra has not proved that the strata’s decision not to pay to investigate was unreasonable.

62.   First, I find that while Incredible Restorations’ report raises the possibility of a leaking pipe, this does not necessarily mean that the pipe is common property. Under section 1 of the SPA, only certain pipes are common property. There is no evidence about how the pipes in the ceiling connect to the strata’s overall plumbing, so it is impossible to determine whether they are common property.

63.   More importantly, I find that Incredible Restorations’ report was based in part on Ms. Jobanputra’s inaccurate statement that their family never used the ensuite bathroom. I find that Incredible Restorations likely never considered the possibility of water spillage. I find that this makes its report less reliable.

64.   The strata also says that Ms. Jobanputra did not report any further issues with their kitchen ceiling after August 2022. The strata argues that this lack of communication suggests that there is not a persistent leak, which is more consistent with intermittent water spillage from the upstairs bathroom than a leaky pipe. I agree with the strata that if there was a persistent leak dripping into unit 4’s kitchen, Ms. Jobanputra likely would have continued to report it and demand action. I find that the water issue was likely intermittent and occasional, which common sense suggests is unlikely to be from a pipe with continuous waterflow.

65.   I dismiss Ms. Jobanputra’s claims about the kitchen leak. However, the strata’s duty to investigate is ongoing, and it must maintain an open mind about the kitchen leak if it receives new information.

Should I order the strata to refund Ms. Jobanputra’s special levy contributions?

66.   Ms. Jobanputra argues that the way the strata has raised special levies and collected payment has persistently contravened the SPA. There are 3 special levies at issue: 2 in 2018 and one in 2022. I note that Ms. Jobanputra’s claim for a $30,390 refund of special levies appears to contain a math error. In a document setting out their calculation of this amount, Ms. Jobanputra lists 6 special levy contributions that total $32,147.16. Given my conclusion, nothing turns on this error.

67.   I agree that the strata breached the SPA in numerous ways in how it presented, approved, and collected the 2018 special levies. For example, section 108(3) says that a resolution approving a special levy must include the total amount, and if payments are due in instalments, the due dates of each instalment. However, the strata passed what Ms. Jobanputra called a “blank cheque” resolution at the May 2018 AGM that allowed the strata to increase the amount as needed via email. I find this approach breached section 108(3). I also agree with Ms. Jobanputra that the notice for the 2018 AGM did not include certain mandatory information like the full wording of the resolution raising the special levy, as required by section 46(3).

68.   The strata raised a further special levy at the November 2018 SGM. There, the owners approved a $62,685 special levy for the rest of the anticipated repairs. The resolution said that the entire special levy was “due and payable immediately” but that “as a matter of financial convenience”, the owners only needed to pay a total of $14,437.50 immediately, with the rest coming due in biweekly payments when the repair project resumed.

69.   The resolution goes on to say that the payment method described above was not an “instalment” as that word is used in section 108(3)(e) of the SPA, which is the provision that requires due dates for special levy instalments. However, I find that the plain meaning of an “instalment” is a partial payment, which is what the resolution contemplated. I find that the strata cannot opt out of a mandatory SPA provision simply by passing a resolution saying that an instalment is not an instalment. I find that the resolution raising the special levy breached section 108 of the SPA.

70.   Of Ms. Jobanputra’s refund claim, $25,375.01 is based on the 2018 special levies. The difficulty here is that the work is complete. The strata has spend all the funds raised by the 2018 special levies. I find that ordering the strata to repay only Ms. Jobanputra’s share of the special levy when the owners were all equally impacted by the strata’s SPA breaches would amount to a windfall for Ms. Jobanputra.

71.   That leaves Ms. Jobanputra’s share of the $40,000 special levy raised at the June 2022 SGM. The resolution raising this special levy was very similar to the November 2018 resolution. Here, the resolution said that the owners may defer payment until the strata had to pay a deposit, invoice, or expense in relation to the repairs. At that time, the resolution said each owner’s share of the expense would be due within 48 hours of receiving an invoice. Again, I find that this method of deferring payment breaches section 108(3)(e) of the SPA. I therefore find that the resolution raising the $40,000 special levy is invalid.

72.   There is no evidence that any owner has paid anything towards the June 2022 special levy because the work on unit 4 has not started yet. There is therefore nothing to refund, so I dismiss that claim. While Ms. Jobanputra did not request this order, in these circumstances, I find it appropriate to order the strata to hold an SGM to consider a new resolution raising a special levy for the unit 4 repairs. If it passes, this will cure the past errors. I order the strata to do so within 60 days. I order the strata to conduct the unit 4 balcony repairs within 60 days of this SGM.  

Has the strata treated Ms. Jobanputra significantly unfairly?

73.   Ms. Jobanputra argues that the strata has treated them significantly unfairly. The CRT has authority to make orders remedying a strata corporation’s significantly unfair actions or decisions under section 123(2) of the CRTA. That provision contains similar language to section 164 of the SPA, which allows the BC Supreme Court to make orders remedying significantly unfair actions or decisions. The test for significant unfairness is the same for CRT disputes and court actions (see Dolnik v. The Owners, Strata Plan LMS 1350, 2023 BCSC 113).

74.   In Kunzler v. The Owners, Strata Plan EPS 1433, 2021 BCCA 173, the court confirmed that significantly unfair actions are those that are burdensome, harsh, wrongful, lacking in probity or fair dealing, done in bad faith, unjust, or inequitable. In applying this test, the owner or tenant’s objectively reasonable expectations are relevant, but not determinative. The use of the word “significant” means that the impugned conduct must go beyond mere prejudice or trifling unfairness.

75.   Ms. Jobanputra’s arguments about significant unfairness largely mirror the arguments they made about the strata’s repair and maintenance decisions, mostly focused on the balcony repairs. For the reasons outlined above, I find that the strata mostly acted reasonably in how it handled Ms. Jobanputra’s repair requests. The only exception was its decision to place conditions on its investigation of the bathroom mold. While I found that decision unreasonable, it is not necessarily significantly unfair for a strata corporation to misunderstand its repair and maintenance obligations. Here, I find from the parties’ correspondence that the strata’s position was not malicious or targeted at Ms. Jobanputra. While it was a mistake, I find no evidence of bad faith. Even though it was reasonable for Ms. Jobanputra to expect the strata to investigate the bathroom issue at its expense, I find that the strata’s breach of that expectation was not significantly unfair.

76.   Ms. Jobanputra points to numerous examples of times they say the strata treated them differently from other owners. For example, Ms. Jobanputra argues that the strata’s decision to investigate the cause of the hole in unit 4’s balcony was unfair because no other owner was threatened with such an investigation. However, there is no suggestion that there was any comparable damage to any other balcony that the strata repaired, which explains the different treatment.

77.   Along similar lines, on June 7, 2019, another resident requested reimbursement for a $198.45 plumbing invoice, explaining that the plumber told them it was a “structural” issue. The strata approved the request with no further information requested, which Ms. Jobanputra says is inconsistent with how the strata treated their various repair requests. However, the plumbing invoice indicated that the blockage was in “common property plumbing”, which I find justifies the strata’s reimbursement.

78.   With that, the strata argues that Ms. Jobanputra generally expects the strata to treat them identically to other owners, regardless of context. I agree with that characterization of Ms. Jobanputra’s expectations. The strata argues that equitable treatment does not demand that it respond to each situation in the exact same way. I agree. I find that the strata must maintain an open mind and take the same general approach to issues different owners raise. However, this may include taking a different approach in different circumstances. I find that Ms. Jobanputra’s expectation that they receive identical treatment is unreasonable because it lacks context and perspective.

79.   I further find that Ms. Jobanputra’s expectations about how the strata would respond to their complaints was objectively unreasonable because they essentially expected that the strata would always do what they wanted. As mentioned above, the strata had to prioritize between several significant repairs and make discretionary decisions, which it was entitled to do. Contrary to Ms. Jobanputra’s arguments, I find that the email evidence over the years indicates that the strata continued to treat Ms. Jobanputra equitably and fairly, even as the relationship between them became strained. For example, the strata agreed to replace windows in unit 4 in the fall of 2022, well after Ms. Jobanputra claimed roughly $750,000 in damages against the strata. They also expanded the scope of work for the unit 4 balcony repairs after receiving the reports Ms. Jobanputra provided, as shown by the differences between Solution Renovations’ March and August 2022 reports.

80.   Ms. Jobanputra also alleges that it was significantly unfair for the strata to raise a single $40,000 special levy for unit 4 and unit 2’s repairs, because it compelled them to vote in favour to get unit 4’s repairs funded. I find nothing improper about passing a single resolution for these repairs, and in any event, the strata did not need Ms. Jobanputra’s vote to pass the resolution because every other owner was in favour, and special levies only require a ¾ majority.

81.   Ms. Jobanputra alleges that the strata treated them unfairly by requiring them to get a permit for a renovation but has never got permits for the strata’s repairs. They rely on an email from AS that certain repairs will require a permit. However, AS did not ultimately do these repairs, and I find that the strata was entitled to rely on Solution Renovations’ expertise in determining whether it required permits.

82.   Finally, Ms. Jobanputra argues that the strata did not allow them to rent unit 4 as a vacation rental in 2016 but now allows another owner to do so. The strata admits that another resident rents a bedroom on Airbnb. The strata says this owner obtained the necessary municipal permit and that its bylaws do not prohibit vacation rentals as long as they comply with the City of Vancouver’s bylaws. In 2016, when Ms. Jobanputra raised the issue, CB provided a printout from Vancouver’s website that said that only licensed bed and breakfasts could rent for fewer than 30 days. I infer from this that Vancouver’s bylaws about vacation rentals have since changed, so the legal situation is not the same now as it was in 2016. I find that this justifies the different treatment. I find that Ms. Jobanputra has not proven that the strata’s decision to allow a vacation rental is significantly unfair. I also note that this claim is likely barred by the Limitation Act, as the strata’s denial took place around 6 years before they started this CRT dispute.

83.   For these reasons, I find that Ms. Jobanputra has not proven any significantly unfair actions or decisions. I dismiss this claim.

Should I order the strata to collect unpaid strata fees from CB?

84.   It is undisputed that for many years, CB has not deposited strata fees into the strata’s bank account. Instead, CB pays strata expenses out of their personal bank account and periodically reconciles those expenses against their strata fee obligations to ensure they have not overpaid or underpaid. CB says it is administratively simpler and saves on banking fees. The evidence before me indicates that all the current owners other than Ms. Jobanputra endorse this practice. Ms. Jobanputra does not dispute that CB has paid strata expenses directly, but essentially argues that CB should be given no credit for doing so. This is why Ms. Jobanputra asks for an order that the strata demand CB pay strata fees dating back to 2004, as if CB had paid nothing at all.

85.   As the strata points out, there is nothing explicit in the SPA that prohibits CB’s practice. However, I find the SPA clearly prohibits it by implication.

86.   First, sections 35 and 36 of the SPA, which I discuss in more detail below, require the strata to retain (and disclose on request) bank statements and cancelled cheques. This is to ensure financial transparency, a key organizing principle in the SPA’s governance scheme. I find that this goal is largely undermined if strata expenses are paid from an owner’s personal bank account because the strata cannot provide copies of bank records it does not control. This very issue arose here as CB has declined to provide Ms. Jobanputra with their personal banking records. Even though there is no evidence that CB has under-contributed to the strata’s expenses, the potential for abuse or fraud is obvious. Also, as Ms. Jobanputra points out, if CB passed away while effectively holding strata funds in trust, the strata would face a complicated situation obtaining those funds from CB’s estate.

87.   I also find that this practice is inconsistent with section 92 of the SPA, which requires the strata to meet its expenses out of an operating fund or contingency reserve fund (CRF) to which the owners must contribute. Contrary to the strata’s submissions, I find that paying strata expenses directly from personal funds is not the same as contributing to an operating fund and CRF.

88.   I find that it makes no difference that most strata owners are comfortable with the current practice and trust CB. It also makes no difference that CB has diligently ensured their contributions match their strata fee obligations. I order the strata to collect CB’s strata fees and deposit them into its bank account.

89.   However, I do not order the strata to collect any past strata fees from CB, with an exception I outline below. The strata provided a detailed transaction ledger that sets out the expenses CB paid from June 2020 to June 2022 and reconciles those amounts with CB’s strata fee obligations. I find that these records establish that the strata has not suffered a loss. In other words, I find that CB contributed the correct amount of money to the strata’s operations, just in an incorrect manner.

90.   The exception is that CB holds back $20 month as a payment for their services on strata council. This practice goes back many years with the informal approval of most or all of the other owners. However, section 34 of the SPA permits remuneration for performing strata council duties only if it is approved in advance in a budget, a bylaw, or a ¾ vote resolution at a general meeting. The strata only formally voted to approve the $20 payment in May 2022. I find that the $20 payments before this vote were invalid. In effect, this means CB underpaid their strata fees by $20 each month until June 1, 2022.

91.   Ms. Jobanputra started the CRT dispute about CB’s strata fees on August 22, 2022. The Limitation Act applies to the CRT, and sets a 2-year limitation period for most claims. I find that Ms. Jobanputra is barred from making a claim about the $20 payments before August 22, 2020. I order the strata to collect $20 of strata fees from CB from September 1, 2020, through May 1, 2022, which is $420.

Should I make any orders about the strata’s finances?

92.   Ms. Jobanputra asks for several orders about the strata’s financial management. Specifically, they ask for an order that the strata open more bank accounts and that the strata be audited, either by an external auditor or Ms. Jobanputra (who says they are an accountant). Ms. Jobanputra also asks for a more general order that the strata follow the SPA’s financial requirements.

93.   The strata argues that it has had the same recordkeeping and reporting procedures for many years. The strata says Ms. Jobanputra has therefore known about all of the alleged breaches of the SPA for more than 2 years, since they have owned their strata lot since around 2005. So, the strata says Ms. Jobanputra’s claims about its compliance with the SPA’s financial requirements is out of time under the Limitation Act. I disagree. The strata’s obligations to comply with the SPA are ongoing and Ms. Jobanputra does not request any specific remedies about the strata’s records from more than 2 years before they started this CRT dispute. With that, I will address each claim in turn.

Bank Accounts

94.   Ms. Jobanputra wants the strata to open additional bank accounts so that it can have separate accounts for its operating fund, CRF, and special levy funds. Ms. Jobanputra says this is necessary to account separately for these funds, as required by section 6.7(1) of the Strata Property Regulation (SPR). I agree that the strata has failed to account separately for the operating fund and CRF. The strata’s financial statements in evidence are relatively detailed and the strata has, over the years, purchased numerous GICs with its excess funds. However, while these funds may function the strata’s CRF, there is nothing in the financial statements to suggest it maintains a CRF separately from its operating fund. This is also apparent from the strata’s budgets, which do not include any contributions to a CRF, contrary to section 6.6 of the SPR. The strata’s failure to explicitly account for the operating fund and CRF separately also means that there is no way to tell whether it has contributed the legislated minimum to the CRF as set out in section 6.1 of the SPR.

95.   That said, nothing in the SPA requires the strata to open separate bank accounts for its operating fund, CRF, and special levy funds. While many strata corporations choose to do so as an administrative convenience and for added clarity, I find no legal obligation to do so. I dismiss this part of Ms. Jobanputra’s claim.

96.   As for Ms. Jobanputra more general requested order, the CRT will not generally grant orders that a strata corporation follow the SPA. This is because the order simply repeats a legal obligation the strata already has. I decline to grant such a general order. However, I agree with Ms. Jobanputra that the strata has not properly recorded the operating fund and CRF separately in its financial statements and budgets. I order it to prepare an updated budget and financial statement for the current fiscal year that complies with sections 6.6 and 6.7 of the SPR. The strata will have 30 days to do so.

Audit

97.   I considered the purpose of a strata corporation audit in Dugas v. The Owners, Strata Plan K180, 2021 BCCRT 948. There, like here, the applicant owner believed that the strata’s financial records were deficient. I found that audits are an extraordinary remedy because they are administratively burdensome and costly. I found that to justify such an order, there must be credible allegations about missing money, whether through fraud or carelessness. I find those principles apply equally here. While Ms. Jobanputra believes that the strata’s financial recordkeeping is deficient, they have provided no evidence of missing funds. Ms. Jobanputra says this is because the strata has not been transparent, but I do not agree. I find that Ms. Jobanputra has sufficiently detailed documentation to establish whether there may be missing funds. This includes detailed transaction reports that set out the expenses CB paid directly.

98.   Ms. Jobanputra also alleges that the strata has failed to keep its books in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). I concluded in Dugas that a strata’s compliance with GAAP is a matter outside the common knowledge of an ordinary person. This means there must be expert evidence to establish a failure to comply with GAAP. I acknowledge that Ms. Jobanputra claims to have accounting expertise, but even if that is true, a party cannot be an expert in their own case because they lack the required impartiality and neutrality. So, I find that Ms. Jobanputra’s detailed submissions about the strata’s financial records are essentially an attempt to provide expert evidence, and I therefore do not accept them. That said, I note that CB provided a detailed response to Ms. Jobanputra’s line-by-line review of the strata’s bank accounts, which appear to explain most, if not all, of the issues Ms. Jobanputra identified.

99.   I therefore find that Ms. Jobanputra has not established that the strata’s financial recordkeeping is so deficient that an audit is warranted. I dismiss this claim.

Must the strata provide Ms. Jobanputra with any records?

100.   Section 35 of the SPA sets out a lengthy list of records that the strata must create or retain. Section 36 of the SPA says that the strata must provide access to or copies of any section 35 record within 2 weeks of a request (except for bylaws and rules, where the deadline is 1 week). Section 4.1 of the SPR sets out how long the strata must retain different types of records. The strata has no obligation under the SPA to create, retain, or disclose records that are not listed in section 35. Along similar lines, the CRT has no authority to order a strata corporation to create or disclose records that are not listed in section 35. See The Owners, Strata Plan NWS 1018 v. Hamilton, 2019 BCSC 863.

101.   I acknowledge the strata’s submission that Ms. Jobanputra has made repetitive and unclear records requests over the years. I infer from this that the strata believes Ms. Jobanputra’s requests are unreasonable and burdensome, and that it has disclosed enough. I generally agree that despite the mandatory nature of sections 35 and 36 of the SPA, a strata corporation is not obligated to respond to vexatious or bad faith records requests: see, for example, Mellor v. The Owners, Strata Plan KAS 463, 2018 BCCRT 1. However, I find that it is not burdensome or unreasonable for an owner to request records specifically set out in section 35, even if responding to the request will be time consuming. This is because these provisions are the primary mechanism for transparency. I find that the records Ms. Jobanputra requests in this dispute are reasonable to the extent they are records listed in section 35.

102.   Ms. Jobanputra asks for an order that the strata provide all “leak assessments” from AS, including reports and photos. Section 35(2)(n.2) requires the strata to retain copies of any reports it obtains about major repair or maintenance items. The strata says it has no written reports from AS beyond what is contained in their invoices, and there is no evidence to suggest otherwise. I dismiss this claim.

103.   Ms. Jobanputra also requests photos of the work completed in the other strata lots as part of the special levy repairs. Section 35 of the SPA does not require the strata to take photos of repair or maintenance projects. There is therefore no basis in the SPA for me to order the strata to do so, or to disclose any photos it has of the work. I dismiss this claim.

104.   Ms. Jobanputra also requests “full details” of CB’s use of their personal bank account for strata business, including bank statements. Section 35(2)(l) of the SPA requires the strata to retain copies of its bank statements, cancelled cheques, and certificates of deposit. Above I found that it was improper for CB to use their personal bank account for strata business. However, I find that this does not create a right for Ms. Jobanputra to review CB’s personal bank statements under section 35 of the SPA. It also does not create a right for the strata to obtain them from CB and disclose them to other owners. I dismiss this claim.

105.   Finally, Ms. Jobanputra requests “full disclosure of strata finances, bank statements, tax returns, and financial records”. I dismiss the claim for tax returns because the strata says it has never filed any and there is no evidence to the contrary. Ms. Jobanputra clarified the rest of this broad request in their submissions, and I will assess each specific request in turn.

106.   First, Ms. Jobanputra wants copies of the strata’s banking records. The SPR requires the strata to keep bank statements, cancelled cheques, and certificates of deposit for 6 years. Ms. Jobanputra has undisputedly received copies of the strata’s bank statements from July 2021 to May 2022, and does not request them. However, in response to a request for bank statements, the strata provided a list of transactions from June 2017 to June 2022 in a Word document that it said it downloaded from its online banking account. I agree with Ms. Jobanputra that this does not meet the SPA’s requirements because a Word document can easily be altered. I find that Ms. Jobanputra is entitled to copies of the actual bank statements, and I order the strata to provide 6 years of bank statements except for July 2021 to May 2022. I note that Ms. Jobanputra also argues that the strata has not provided full details of the various GICs it has purchased. I find that the requirement to provide bank statements includes a requirement to provide statements related to investments like GICs. However, I find that the strata has already provided Ms. Jobanputra with information and documents about its GICs beyond what the SPA requires. I do not order any further disclosure related to the strata’s investments.

107.   The strata says that its bank does not provide copies of cancelled cheques. I find that this is not accurate. The Word transaction list mentioned above lists cheques with blue hyperlinks, which I find shows copies of the cheques are available via online banking. In any event, the SPA requires the strata to retain these records, which I find requires the strata to obtain them from its bank. I order the strata to provide 6 years of cancelled cheques.

108.   Ms. Jobanputra requests various invoices, but section 35 of the SPA does not require the strata to provide copies of invoices. See Kayne v. Strata Plan LMS 2375, 2007 BCSC 1610. I dismiss this aspect of Ms. Jobanputra’s claim.

109.   Ms. Jobanputra also says that they want “strata contracts” and “strata correspondence”. I find that this request is too vague for the strata to reasonably respond to it, and in any event, the Dispute Notice only mentioned financial records. So, I find that this request is not properly before me, and I decline to order the strata to provide copies of any contracts or correspondence.

Should I order the strata to pay Ms. Jobanputra damages?

110.   As outlined in the introduction, Ms. Jobanputra claims nearly $750,000 in damages. I have dealt with several specific claims above, and I will deal with the remainder here.

111.   First, Ms. Jobanputra claims $126,750 in damages for a loss of property value for unit 4. They said they lost the opportunity to sell unit 4 at the “height of the property market”. However, they provided no expert evidence about unit 4’s market value or the alleged impact to its market value because of the planned repairs. Instead, they provided general information about a decline in home prices in Vancouver, which I find is insufficient to establish that Ms. Jobanputra suffered a loss. This is particularly so because there is no evidence that Ms. Jobanputra attempted to sell unit 4 at any point and no evidence that any reduction in market value will persist after the repairs are complete. I dismiss this claim.

112.   Ms. Jobanputra claims $25,000 for compromising their family’s safety. They argue that the lack of action about their balcony door repairs increased the risk of a break in. However, no break in ever occurred. Ms. Jobanputra also argues that the presence of mold exposed their family to a risk of health problems. Again, there is no evidence that any family member suffered any health effects because of mold. The CRT, like the court, does not award damages for hypothetical harms that did not materialize. I dismiss this claim.

113.   The remaining 3 claims (for $60,000, $35,000, and $500,000) are more general, and Ms. Jobanputra arguments about them overlap considerably. Ms. Jobanputra alleges both actual losses (known as pecuniary damages) and intangible losses, such as stress (known as non-pecuniary damages). There are also further allegations of hypothetical harms, like “harm due to possible legal actions by Strata”, that I dismiss for the reasons set out above.

114.   I find Ms. Jobanputra’s allegations of tangible harm are vague or unsupported by evidence, or both. For example, Ms. Jobanputra claims that the ongoing special levies required them to remortgage unit 4 and otherwise increased their carrying costs. Along similar lines, Ms. Jobanputra alleges “harm due to paying special levy payments within 48 hours”. However, Ms. Jobanputra provided no evidence of any increased financial burden. Ms. Jobanputra also alleged various harms from the strata’s financial practices. While I agreed with some of Ms. Jobanputra’s arguments about those issues, there is no evidence that Ms. Jobanputra suffered a loss as a result.

115.   Ms. Jobanputra’s claims about intangible losses are similarly flawed. Often, the argument is a single sentence, such as “harm due to lack of transparency and disclosure”. The only non-pecuniary claims that Ms. Jobanputra led any evidence about were related to stress, both their own and their family member’s. First, I find that Ms. Jobanputra has no standing to bring damages claims on behalf of people who are not parties to this dispute, such as family members. In any event, I find that the claim about stress is largely related to Ms. Jobanputra’s claims about mistreatment from the strata, which as discussed above are unfounded.

116.   Finally, while Ms. Jobanputra did not use this term, I find that the absence of evidence about concrete losses could suggest that their claim is at least partly for punitive damages. This may be what Ms. Jobanputra means when they claim “moral compensation”. Punitive damages are intended to punish respondents for malicious or outrageous conduct. Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co., 2002 SCC 18. I have reviewed years of correspondence between Ms. Jobanputra and the other owners about strata matters. I find that the strata’s treatment of Ms. Jobanputra has been fair and measured throughout. I find that the strata has been receptive to Ms. Jobanputra’s ongoing complaints and has treated Ms. Jobanputra with respect. I find no conduct that would justify punitive damages.

117.   In summary, I dismiss Ms. Jobanputra’s damages claims.

TRIBUNAL FEES, EXPENSES

118.   Under section 49 of the CRTA and CRT rules, the CRT will generally order an unsuccessful party to reimburse a successful party for CRT fees and reasonable dispute-related expenses. While I agreed with some of Ms. Jobanputra’s arguments and granted several orders, I find they were substantially unsuccessful. So, I dismiss their claim for CRT fees and dispute-related expenses, including their claim for legal fees. The strata did not claim any dispute-related expenses, so I order none.

119.   The strata must comply with the provisions in section 189.4 of the SPA, which includes not charging dispute-related expenses against Ms. Jobanputra.

DECISION AND ORDERS

120.   I order that:  

a.    The strata collect strata fees from CB by depositing them into its bank account, including $420 in past strata fee underpayments.

b.    Within 14 days of this decision, the strata provide copies of the following records:

                              i.        The strata’s bank statements from July 2017 to the present, except the statements it already provided from July 2021 to May 2022, and

                            ii.        The strata’s cancelled cheques from July 2017 to the present.

c.    Within 30 days of this decision, the strata prepare an updated budget and financial statement for the current fiscal year that complies with sections 6.6 and 6.7 of the SPR.

d.    Within 60 days of this decision, the strata retain a qualified person to investigate the cause of the excessive moisture in unit 4’s ensuite bathroom, at its expense.

e.    Within 60 days of this decision, the strata hold an SGM to consider a ¾ vote resolution raising a special levy to pay for the repairs to unit 4’s limited common property upper and lower balconies.

f.     Within 60 days of the SGM, the strata repair unit 4’s limited common property upper and lower balconies in keeping with recommendations from Solution Renovations or any other qualified contractor the strata may hire. Ms. Jobanputra must allow access to the strata and its contractors at reasonable times on 48 hours’ written notice and otherwise cooperate with the repairs.

121.   I dismiss Ms. Jobanputra’s remaining claims.

122.   Under section 57 of the CRTA, a validated copy of the CRT’s order can be enforced through the British Columbia Supreme Court. Under section 58 of the CRTA, the order can be enforced through the British Columbia Provincial Court if it is an order for financial compensation or return of personal property under $35,000. Once filed, a CRT order has the same force and effect as an order of the court that it is filed in.