Date Issued: August 7, 2025

File: ST-2024-005580

Type: Strata

Civil Resolution Tribunal

Indexed as: Cameron v. The Owners, Strata Plan NW 2769, 2025 BCCRT 1099

Between:

FRANCIS VIVIAN CAMERON

Applicant

And:

The Owners, Strata Plan NW 2769 and MARLENE CHARLES

Respondent

 

REASONS FOR DECISION
Tribunal Member:	J. Garth Cambrey

INTRODUCTION

1.      This strata property dispute is about the use of parking stalls.

2.      The applicant, Francis Cameron, owns strata lot 8 in the respondent strata corporation, The Owners, Strata Plan NW 2769. The respondent, Marlene Charles, owns strata lot 6. I will refer to strata lot 8 and strata lot 6 as SL8 and SL6, respectively. I will also refer to Marlene Charles using her full name or as the respondent, and the strata corporation as the strata. Francis Cameron and Marlene Charles are self-represented. A strata council member represents the strata.

3.      The strata consists of 8 strata lots. Each strata lot has one covered parking stall. Ms. Cameron’s stall is next to Marlene Charles’ stall.

4.      Ms. Cameron says the strata reduced the width of her parking stall by 2 feet and towed her vehicle when it was parked in her stall. She asks for orders that the respondents pay her a total of $1,000 to cover the costs of towing, repairs to her vehicle and a downspout, and stress.

5.      The strata denies it reduced the width of SL8’s stall. It says the Ms. Cameron’s vehicle was towed because it was parked in both SL8’s stall and SL6’s stall and only after she was given ample warning. The strata asks that Ms. Cameron’s claims be dismissed.

6.      The respondent says she shares a parking area with Ms. Cameron and that the entire area was reduced in width to accommodate the installation of a structural support pillar. She parked in other uncovered stalls for several years but made arrangements with the strata to return to using the SL6 stall in January 2024. The respondent essentially agrees with the strata and also asks that Ms. Cameron’s claims be dismissed.

7.      As explained below, I dismiss Ms. Cameron’s claims and this dispute.

JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE

8.      These are the formal written reasons of the Civil Resolution Tribunal or CRT. The CRT has jurisdiction over strata property claims under section 121 of the Civil Resolution Tribunal Act or CRTA. CRTA section 2 says the CRT’s mandate is to provide dispute resolution services accessibly, quickly, economically, informally, and flexibly. In resolving disputes, the CRT must apply principles of law and fairness and recognize any relationships between the dispute’s parties that will likely continue after the CRT process has ended.

9.      CRTA section 39 says the CRT has discretion to decide the format of the hearing, including by writing, telephone, videoconferencing, email, or a combination of these. I find I am properly able to assess and weigh the documentary evidence and submissions before me. I am satisfied an oral hearing is not necessary in the interests of justice, so I decided to hear this dispute through written submissions.

10.   CRTA section 42 says the CRT may accept as evidence information that it considers relevant, necessary, and appropriate, even where the information would not be admissible in court.

11.   Under CRTA section 61, the CRT may make any order or give any direction in relation to a tribunal proceeding it thinks necessary to achieve the objects of the tribunal in accordance with its mandate. In particular, the CRT may make such an order on its own initiative, on request by a party, or on recommendation by a case manager. CRT documents incorrectly show the name of the respondent as NW2769. However, based on section 2 of the Strata Property Act, which I will refer to as the SPA, the correct legal name of the strata is The Owners, Strata Plan NW 2769. Given the parties operated on the basis that the correct name of the strata was used in their documents and submissions, I have exercised my discretion under section 61 to direct the use of the strata’s correct legal name in these proceedings. Accordingly, I have amended the style of cause above.

ISSUES

12.   The issues in this dispute are:

a.    How are the parking stalls assigned?

b.    Are the respondents responsible to Ms. Cameron for any of her claimed damages?

BACKGROUND, EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

13.   In a civil proceeding such as this, as applicant, Ms. Cameron must prove her claims on a balance of probabilities, meaning more likely than not. I have considered all the parties’ submissions and evidence but refer only to information I find relevant to explain my decision.

14.   The strata was created in May 1988 under the Condominium Act and continues to exist under the SPA. It consists of 8 residential strata lots located in a single 2-storey building. There are 8 covered parking stalls next to each other which are accessible by vehicle from a lane. On sheet one of the strata plan under the legend, there is a note that says the parking stalls are limited common property or LCP. The LCP parking stall for SL6 is located at one end of the parking stalls next to the LCP stall for SL8. From the photographs provided, there are support columns located on the perimeter of these 2 stalls but not between them. The strata aptly describes the parking area as a shared carport. The parties agree that in 2007, the strata installed an additional support column on the outside perimeter of the SL6 parking stall near the building during repairs to a patio area above the SL6 stall. I understand the columns nearest the lane were original at the time of the strata’s construction. None of the columns are shown on the strata plan.

15.   Land Title Office documents show the strata filed a consolidated set of bylaws on December 21, 2001, which I infer replaced the Standard Bylaws. The strata has not filed any bylaw amendments since December 2001. I discuss relevant bylaws below as necessary.

How are the parking stalls assigned?

16.   None of the parties addressed the LCP designations of the parking stalls, so I find it necessary to briefly discuss this before considering whether the respondents are responsible for any damages. Under SPA section 1(1), LCP is defined to mean common property designated for the exclusive use of the owners of one or more strata lots.

17.   The courts have addressed the significance of LCP. For example, in Stratton v. Richter, 2022 BCCA 337 at paragraph 86, the court found LCP is a special category of property over which a strata lot owner has a substantial degree of control and something approaching a beneficial interest. Despite the respondent’s submission that the strata plan does not show the dimensions the parking stalls, I find that it does. On sheet 4, it clearly shows the dimensions of the SL6 and SL8 stalls. The dimensions are the same for both stalls at 2.62 metres wide. This equates to 8.6 feet for each stall.

18.   As noted, the LCP parking stall designations were made when the strata’s owner developer originally filed the strata plan. Under SPA section 75, the only way to amend LCP designated by the owner developer on a strata plan is by unanimous vote of the strata, which is a vote in favour by all votes of all eligible voters. An amendment to LCP on this basis also requires an amendment to the strata plan.

19.   Here, there is no record the strata approved a unanimous resolution to change the LCP stalls and strata plan has not been amended, so the original dimensions of the LCP parking stalls have not changed. In other words, the strata did not reduce the width of the SL8 stall as Ms. Cameron suggests, because it would have had to amend the strata plan and it did not do that.

20.   This also means that the respondent’s understanding that the parking area for both strata lots is shared by the SL6 and SL8 owners is incorrect. The photographs show the additional support column added in 2007 runs perpendicular to the perimeter of the SL6 stall farthest from the SL8 stall and thus only encroaches into the SL6 stall. I estimate this column enters the SL6 stall by about 2 feet, thus requiring the respondent to park her vehicle about that distance closer to Ms. Cameron’s vehicle.

21.   Photographs of the 2 stalls show a yellow line drawn on the concrete floor of the parking stalls. Ms. Cameron says, and the respondents do not disputr, that the strata and the respondent made an artificial dividing line to separate the 2 stalls, which I infer is the yellow line in the photographs. However, the parties did not provide evidence about how far the yellow line was from either side of the parking stalls and none of the photographs show the respondent’s vehicle is parked over the yellow line. In other words, it is unclear where the yellow line is situated in relation to the 2 parking stalls.

22.   The respondent says she owns a 2021 Nissan Qashqai. This is the vehicle in the photographs that is parked in her stall. Based on the manufacturer’s specifications for this vehicle, it is 72.3 inches wide or 6.025 feet. Therefore, if she parks beside the additional support column as the photographs show, the width of her vehicle plus the column equals about 8.025 feet. That means it is possible for the respondent to park her vehicle immediately next to the column and still park within her parking stall, which I have noted is 8.6 feet wide.

23.   Ms. Cameron owns a Honda CR-Z, which is clearly smaller than the Nissan Qashqai, so I find Ms. Cameron can also park with her LCP parking stall without encroaching on the SL6 parking stall.

24.   With this background in mind, I now address the respondents’ responsibility to reimburse Ms. Cameron for her claimed expenses.

Are the respondents responsible to Ms. Cameron for any of her claimed damages?

25.   I will address each of Ms. Cameron’s damage claims in turn.

Towing expense

26.   It is undisputed that Ms. Cameron used the entire parking area available for SL6 and SL8 to park her vehicle for at least 2 years before it was towed on January 13, 2024. This was possible because the respondent parked her vehicle elsewhere on the strata’s property during that time.

27.   Email evidence among the parties exchanged between December 29, 2023 and January 13, 2024, confirm the respondent’s intention to again use the SL6 parking stall commencing January 1, 2024. The strata provided a photograph that shows Ms. Cameron’s vehicle was clearly parked in both parking stalls. In an email, the strata confirmed Ms. Cameron’s vehicle would be towed if she continued to use both stalls. The exchange also confirms Ms. Cameron’s objection to the respondent’s use of the parking area based on Ms. Cameron’s understanding that area was not wide enough for 2 vehicles to park.

28.   Ms. Cameron says her vehicle was parked in her stall when it was towed. The respondent and the strata say Ms. Cameron’s vehicle was parked partially in the respondent’s stall as shown in the photograph, making it impossible for the respondent to park her vehicle.

29.   Based on the email exchange and the overall evidence, I accept that it was more likely than not that Ms. Cameron’s vehicle was parked in both stalls when it was towed on January 13, 2024. Further, I also accept that the respondent and a council member attempted to discuss the issue with Ms. Cameron in person at the entrance to her strata lot before the vehicle was towed, but that Ms. Cameron refused to answer the door or her telephone. The attempted discussion was set out in an email to Ms. Cameron from the council member dated January 12, 2023, to which Ms. Cameron did not object.

30.   It appears towing the vehicle was a joint effort between the respondent and the strata. The respondent apparently contacted the towing company, and a council member met the tow driver when the vehicle was removed. In any event, I find that the respondent had a right to have the vehicle towed because it was in her LCP parking stall.

31.   I also find the strata had a right to tow the vehicle under bylaws 3(1)(b) and (d), and SPA section 133. Bylaw 3(1)(b) says an owner must not unreasonably interfere with the rights of another person to use and enjoy common property, which includes LCP as defined under SPA section 1(1). Bylaw 3(1)(d) says an owner must use common property in a way that is contrary to purpose for which it is intended as shown on the strata plan. I find Ms. Cameron contravened these bylaws by parking her vehicle partially in the LCP parking stall designated for the respondent’s exclusive use. As explained, Ms. Cameron is not entitled to use the respondent’s designated stall. SPA section 133 permits the strata to do what is reasonably necessary to remedy a contravention of its bylaws, including removing objects from common property.

32.   For these reasons, I dismiss Ms. Cameron’s claim for reimbursement of her towing expense.

Downpipe and vehicle expenses

33.   There is no date on the downpipe repair invoice, so it is unclear when that damage occurred. It is also unclear when Ms. Cameron may have damaged her vehicle, but the repair estimate she provided is dated February 10, 2025, about a year after the respondent returned to parking in her stall. I find it reasonable to infer the damages occurred after January 1, 2024, when the respondent resumed using her parking stall.

34.   There are no photographs of the damage to Ms. Cameron’s vehicle, although the repair estimate describes repairs needed to the front left bumper cover and panel, which is consistent with the location of the downpipe and original support column. All of these things align with Ms. Cameron’s described concerns and make the damages plausible if Ms. Cameron drives into her stall as she says. However, as I have mentioned, there is no evidence before me that the respondent parked in Ms. Cameron’s parking stall as the respondent’s vehicle fits into SL6’s stall, even accounting for the width of the additional column. While I agree with Ms. Cameron that parking her vehicle in her stall is more difficult when the respondent’s vehicle is parked beside her, she does not say she cannot park her vehicle in her stall if that is the case.

35.   Based on the overall evidence, I dismiss Ms. Cameron’s claim against the respondent for damages sustained to her vehicle and the downpipe.

36.   I also dismiss Ms. Cameron’s claim against the strata as there is simply no evidence to support that the strata was involved in causing the damages Ms. Cameron’s claims.

Stress claim

37.   Finally, I consider whether the respondents caused Ms. Cameron to suffer stress such that they should compensate her. I take Ms. Cameron’s claim to be for damages for mental distress. As discussed in Lau v. Royal Bank of Canada, 2017 BCCA 253, there must be evidence to support a claim of mental distress. Ms. Cameron provided a letter from her doctor dated February 10, 2025. The letter simply states Ms. Cameron reported a significant stressful situation about the size of her parking stall to the doctor in June 2024. The doctor also stated that the situation is ongoing and causing Ms. Cameron a significant amount of emotional anguish.

38.   I appreciate that parking a vehicle in a defined area after years of parking without worry of a parked vehicle in an adjacent parking stall might be stressful, but the respondent is entitled to use her LCP parking stall. Further, I have found that the size of Ms. Cameron’s parking stall has not changed and that she has not proved the respondent is using part of her stall, or that the strata authorized the respondent to use park of her stall. Therefore, I cannot find either the respondent, or the strata directly caused Ms. Cameron’s stress, and I dismiss her claim.

39.   The parties provided a large amount of submissions about alternative arrangements that were offered or could be made to assist with allowing Ms. Cameron and the respondent to park their vehicles more easily. This included swapping stalls with other owners or having the respondent park closer to the outside edge of her stall in front of the additional support column. The latter would require the respondent’s vehicle to be parked partially outside of her stall next to the lane. Ms. Cameron did not ask for remedies relating to alternate parking, so I will not address their submissions other than to say there may be ways to rearrange parking, even on a temporary basis, which is more workable to the parties than the current arrangements.

CRT FEES AND EXPENSES

40.   Under CRTA section 49 and the CRT rules, the CRT will generally order an unsuccessful party to reimburse a successful party for CRT fees and reasonable dispute-related expenses. Ms. Cameron was not successful, and the respondents did not pay CRT fees, so I make no order for CRT fees.

41.   The parties did not claim dispute-related expenses, so I order none.

42.   The strata must comply with section 189.4 of the SPA, which includes not charging dispute-related expenses against Ms. Cameron.

DECISION

43.   I dismiss Ms. Cameron’s claims and this dispute.